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ABSTRACT
One of the most consequential yet unexamined developments in finance
is the recent evolution of large financial technology platforms. In the first
analysis of its kind, we scrutinize the world’s $89 trillion investment and
asset management industry to explore the function of these systems, to
consider their possible risks, and to develop a taxonomy for their regulation.
This analysis is essential because these systems now play a critical role in
asset management, rendering nugatory several layers of existing regulation.
While the COVID-19 pandemic has caused havoc with economic activity, it
has accelerated this process of digitization and concentration of financial
control.
The leading example of such a platform is BlackRock’s Aladdin, a
system used to manage the risks relating to ten percent of the world’s
investment assets and which institutional investors – as well as the U.S.
government – admit they cannot operate without. Even greater
concentrations of financial power are possible when Big Technology firms
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and finance unite. Ant Group, a spinoff of Alibaba, controls a financial
ecosystem for over 1.2 billion clients – twenty-one percent of the world’s
adults – covering all financial services, including payments, insurance, asset
management, and deposits. Large U.S. financial and tech firms, including
Facebook, Apple, and Google, are working hard to emulate Ant’s scale and
scope, driving concentration into a small number of dominant digital finance
platforms.
Although Financial Technology is typically associated with small
innovative firms, we argue that these giant digital finance platforms are
already having a far greater impact on society. We identify the economic
reasons for the dramatic ascendancy of these financial leviathans and
propose a legal framework for mitigating their threats to national security,
financial stability, consumer protection, antitrust and cybersecurity.
Aladdin is like oxygen. Without it we wouldn’t be able to function.
– Anthony Malloy, CEO of New York Life Investors1
INTRODUCTION
The raging COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically exposed fragilities in
the world’s public health systems. The virus has also, less obviously,
sounded warning bells about weaknesses in our global financial system. In
February and March 2020, thousands of investment funds managing billions
of dollars in retirement assets, and some fifty million American households,
withdrew from investment markets. 2 The result was one of the largest
financial market corrections in history.3 But imagine, if you will, if the
technology underlying international financial markets had proven as
vulnerable as our public health systems. If global financial systems had
malfunctioned during that period of acute economic stress – for instance, the
failure of a major payment or securities trading system – the consequences
for the world’s markets would have been catastrophic.
The myriad potential ways in which such systems can fail is daunting
and exposes our total dependence on massive, unseen, and largely
1. Antoine Gara, BlackRock’s Edge: Why Technology Is Creating the Amazon of Wall
Street, FORBES (Dec. 26, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2017/12/
19/blackrocks-edge-why-technology-is-creating-a-6-trillion-amazon-of-wall-street/#6fbfcdc
6561b [https://perma.cc/966E-SQ9C].
2. Matt Phillips Peter Eavis &David Enrich, Economy Faces ‘Tornado-Like Headwind’
as Financial Markets Spiral, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/03/09/business/stock-market-oil-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/Y3CX-3U9E].
3. INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: MARKETS IN THE
TIME OF COVID-19 1–6 (2020), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2020/04/
14/global-financial-stability-report-april-2020 [https://perma.cc/7VVT-3FGN].
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unregulated financial technology platforms: a failure to deliver securities
after payment could destroy a buyer’s investment and a failure to honor stop-
loss orders in a falling market could impose massive losses on clients, while
the failure of a major securities trading or payment systemwould cause panic
and probably widespread financial chaos and collapse. Service interruptions
of minutes or even seconds have contributed to severe market reactions in
the past.4
Once participants lose trust in financial market infrastructure they will
naturally seek to preserve value by withdrawing: client demands for payment
could turn into bank or money market runs, ruining financially sound
institutions; money market funds could “break the buck,” crippling one of
the central financial management tools for millions of Americans and
disrupting a key financing mechanism of the U.S. economy; and retirement
investments through 401(k) accounts could be frozen, casting citizens loose
from their financial lifelines. In short, financial intermediation – the process
by which the supply of finance meets its demand – could cease, cutting off
the flow of money at the most important moment. In healthy times, this chain
reaction could prompt a financial and economic crisis as severe as the Great
Recession of 2008. In the current pandemic, when economic growth
depends on financial intermediation, the desperately needed economic
recovery could judder to a halt,5 threatening a second Great Depression on
the scale of 1929.
Technology’s benefits are undisputable: speed, scale and efficiency, to
name a few. But as financial technology (“FinTech”) and market
infrastructure have grown in size, scope, and influence, the consequences of
their failures have increased commensurately. Thus, there is rising fear
about the potential impact of these technological vulnerabilities. On a
positive note, securities market and payment infrastructure have to date been
resilient in the face of the COVID-19 stress test.6 Nevertheless, a range of
emerging risks and vulnerabilities in the asset management industry have
4. See Patrick Gillespie, Matt Egan & Heather Long, Trading Resumes on NYSE After
Nearly 4-hour Outage, CNN BUS. (July 8, 2015, 7:23 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2015/07/
08/investing/nyse-suspends-trading/ [https://perma.cc/DM2W-QMSK] (reporting that a
software update prompted the NYSE to halt trading for four hours, which contributed to the
Dow losing 1.5% in a single day).
5. See JOSEPHA. SCHUMPETER, THETHEORY OFECONOMICDEVELOPMENT - AN INQUIRY
INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE (Redvers Opie trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press ed. 1934) (discussing the importance of financial intermediation for
economic prosperity). See Robert G. King & Ross Levine, Finance and Growth: Schumpeter
Might Be Right, 108 Q. J. ECON. 717 (1993), (discussing a contemporary assessment).
6. Jacob Manoukian, 3 Reasons Why the Stock Market Has Shrugged off the COVID
Surge, J.P.MORGAN (July 17, 2020), https://www.jpmorgan.com/securities/insights/3-reasons
-why-stock-market-shrugged-off-covid-surge [https://perma.cc/SR7K-Z2GZ].
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emerged, which are being monitored by the Securities Exchange
Commission and others.7 Of concern, the largest financial and technology
firms have only increased their concentrations of power during COVID-19:
Jeff Bezos has added almost $60 billion to his personal wealth in 2020 alone,
while America’s leading banks have grown even bigger,8 and BlackRock,
the world’s largest asset manager and operator of the world’s largest risk
management platform – “Aladdin”9 – is reported to have had a “very good
pandemic” as it has, once again, been allocated a central role in orchestrating
financial and economic intervention programs for the Federal Reserve.10
This Article analyzes the technological platforms which underpin our
financial system and create risks and vulnerabilities of systemic dimensions,
so far largely overlooked by scholars and supervisory authorities. In fact, all
leading U.S. financial institutions 11 and many large technology firms
(“BigTechs”) including Alibaba, Amazon, Apple, Facebook,12 Google, and
7. See Meeting Notice, SEC Asset Management Advisory Committee, 85 Fed. Reg.
37705 (June 23, 2020) (notifying that a public discussion on matters in the asset management
industry such as “data and technology” will be held). For global work on market
infrastructure, seeBANK FOR INT’LSETTLEMENTS&INT’LORG.OFSEC. COMM’NS, PRINCIPALS
OF FINANCIALMARKET INFRASTRUCTURES (2012), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf
/IOSCOPD350.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4PP-JNPE].
8. Zack Budryk, Jeff Bezos’s Wealth Hits Record High $171B, THEHILL (July 1, 2020,
7:35 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/finance/505543-jeff-bezoss-wealth-hits-record-high-171
-billion [https://perma.cc/WM4M-98H5] (“The Bloomberg Billionaires index previously put
Bezos’s net worth at $167.7 billion in September 2018, but he is estimated to have accrued at
least $56.7 billion in 2020 alone, Bloomberg reported.”); David Benoit, Coronavirus Made
America’s Biggest Banks Even Bigger, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/a
rticles/coronavirus-made-america-s-biggest-banks-even-bigger-11587639602 [https://perma.
cc/2ZVH-VJAF] (explaining companies and consumers inundated U.S. banks with “$1
trillion of deposits in the first quarter, when markets went haywire and America went dark to
stop the spread of the new coronavirus,” more than half of which “went to the four largest
banks in America”).
9. For a comprehensive discussion of Aladdin as an archetype of back-end financial
operating systems, see infra Part I.B.
10. Kate Aronoff, Is BlackRock the New Vampire Squid?, THENEW REPUBLIC (June 26,
2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/158263/blackrock-climate-change-fossil-fuel-investm
ents [https://perma.cc/C6CJ-MA59].
11. Financial institutions that have launched a digital finance platform include banks such
as J.P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs; asset manager giants like BlackRock, Fidelity, and
Vanguard; and broker-dealers such as Charles Schwab. Leading internationally, in terms of
its system integration and customer base, is the Chinese Alibaba group, with its payment app,
Alipay, and its investment arm, Ant Financial. See infra Parts II.B.-E.
12. See Dirk Zetzsche, Ross Buckley & Douglas Arner, Regulating Libra, 40 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2020) (discussing Facebook’s Libra project); Daniel Keyes,
WhatsApp Pay is on the Verge of Launching in India, BUS. INSIDER (July 2, 2019, 9:55 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/whatsapp-pay-ready-for-india-launch-2019-7?IR=T [https:
//perma.cc/L85Z-VMD6] (discussing the introduction of Facebook’s WhatsApp Pay in India
where the chat app’s user base is estimated to be “between 350 million and 400 million
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Tencent,13 are investing billions of dollars to create dominant information
technology systems, platforms, and ecosystems across the financial universe,
to the point where today financial platforms Visa and MasterCard are the
largest financial institutions globally by market capitalization. Looking first
at asset management, we consider BlackRock’s Aladdin and similar
platforms by Vanguard, Fidelity, Goldman, and J.P. Morgan Chase as
striking examples of growing size and dominance. These American models
largely attempt to emulate another BigTech turned finance giant which
operates the archetypal financial ecosystem: Ant Group. An affiliate of Jack
Ma’s Alibaba and formerly named Ant Financial, Ant has over 1.2 billion
clients and was valued at $280 billion, over three times that of Goldman
Sachs, immediately prior to its planned initial public offering (IPO) in
November 2020. This IPO was halted at the time of writing because of
concerns from Chinese financial regulators. 14 Whether and how these
platforms should be regulated – the central concern of this Article – is thus a
matter of high priority, made more so by their strong growth as a result of
the COVID-19 pandemic.
In many ways, the rise of digital finance platforms reflects the powerful
response of massive, established financial institutions to efforts by FinTech
start-ups to disrupt the industry. Indeed, financial services cannot
meaningfully be analyzed today without considering FinTech;15 and any
such analysis requires an understanding of the underlying technologies: Big
users”).
13. See BANK OF INT’L SETTLEMENT, ANNUAL ECONOMIC REPORT 55–79 (2019),
https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2019e.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WY2-GL83] (detailing
financial services-related activities of big technology firms such as Apple, Amazon, Alibaba,
Google and Facebook, and discussing opportunities and risks of BigTech in finance).
14. AntGroup’s Stalled IPO Seen Slashing its Value by $140 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Nov.
9, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-09/ant-group-s-stalled-ipo-
seen-slashing-its-value-by-140-billion?sref=lP8hg7Cm [https://perma.cc/7J6C-CXDL]; Jack
Ma’s Ant Group Raises IPO Valuation Target to $280 Billion, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 16,
2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-16/jack-ma-s-ant-group-raises-
ipo-valuation-target-to-280-billion [https://perma.cc/8LA6-2DX2]. According to Forbes,
Goldman Sachs has a market capitalization of $80.57 billion. Goldman Sachs Group (GS),
FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/companies/goldman-sachs-group/#2e9741f32773 [https://p
erma.cc/29ZU-YKJX] (last visited Nov. 20, 2020).
15. See generally Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84
FORDHAML.REV. 977 (2015) (arguing that securities regulation must be adapted to FinTech);
Chris Brummer & Yesha Yadav, FinTech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO. L.J. 235,
248–49 (2019) (describing FinTech regulation as a trilemma where regulators must ensure
innovation, simple rules and market integrity at the same time); Kathryn Judge, Investor-
Driven Financial Innovation, 8 HARV. BUS. L.REV. 291, 343–48 (2018) (arguing that FinTech
should be used to avoid suboptimal regulation-inspired over-demand); Dirk Zetzsche, Ross
Buckley, Douglas Arner & Janos Barberis, From FinTech to TechFin: The Regulatory
Challenges of Data-Driven Finance, 14 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 393, 435–43 (2018) (arguing in
favor of data-specific adjustments to financial regulations).
280 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OFBUSINESS LAW [Vol. 23:1
Data 16 and artificial intelligence, 17 distributed ledger technology and
blockchain, 18 smart contracts 19 and cloud-based services. But existing
scholarly attention has too often focused on the consumer end of financial
services, such as new modes of mobile payment,20 robo-advice,21 initial coin
16. See generally Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104
CALIF. L. REV. 671, 677 (2016) (highlighting data dependency and the risk that algorithms
reinforce existing biases); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904,
1918 (2013) (arguing that Big Data furthers surveillance of individuals and asking to
strengthen privacy); Stacy-Ann Elvy, Paying for Privacy and the Personal Data Economy,
117 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1400–28 (2017) (highlighting tensions between a commercial data
market and consumer privacy).
17. See generally Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, Self-Driving Contracts, 43 J.
CORP. L. 1, 13–26 (2017) (arguing that technology will lead to subject-specific, self-
completing contract law); Anthony J. Casey & Anthony Niblett, A Framework for the New
Personalization of Law, 86 U.CHI. L.REV. 333 (2019) (developing preconditions for AI-based
reconfiguration of the law); Mark Lemley & Bryan Casey, Remedies for Robots, 86 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1311 (2019) (conceptualizing compensation and sanction systems for artificial
intelligence); Bryan Casey & Mark Lemley, You Might Be a Robot, 105 CORNELL L. REV.
287 (2020) (analyzing definitions of AI for the purpose of regulation); Harry Surden,Machine
Learning and Law, 89 WASH. L. REV. 87, 102–10 (2014) (discussing how AI may affect the
practice of the law).
18. See generally PRIMAVERADE FILIPPI&AARONWRIGHT, BLOCKCHAIN AND THE LAW:
THE RULE OF CODE (Harvard Univ. Press 2018) (acknowledging the opportunities of
blockchain technologies and arguing that the law needs to catch up because blockchain could
undermine the capacity of governmental authorities to supervise commercial activities and
vital government-provided services); Usha Rodrigues, Law and the Blockchain, 104 IOWA L.
REV. 679, 708–27 (2019) (analyzing default rules from corporate, partnership and contract
law that could fill the gaps in smart contracts); Dirk Zetzsche, Ross Buckley &Douglas Arner,
The Distributed Liability of Distributed Ledgers: Legal Risks of Blockchain, 2018 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1361, 1382–1402 (2018) (arguing that existing doctrines of contract, corporate and
partnership law apply to distributed ledgers and could establish a participant’s liability).
19. See generally Jeremy M. Sklaroff, Smart Contracts and the Cost of Inflexibility, 166
U. PA. L. REV. 263 (2017) (examining the disadvantages to smart contracts and the costs that
may outweigh the benefits); Kevin Werbach & Nicolas Cornell, Contracts Ex Machina, 67
DUKE L.J. 313 (2017) (analyzing the potential and the limitations of smart contracts and the
relationship to contract law).
20. See Adam J. Levitin, Pandora’s Digital Box: The Promise and Perils of Digital
Wallets, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 305 (2017) (analyzing the risks and benefits that digital wallets
pose to consumers and merchants).
21. See Tom Baker & Benedict G. C. Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the
Financial Services Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV. 713 (2018) (“identifying the core components
of robo advisors, key questions that regulators need to be able to answer about them, and the
capacities that regulators need to develop in order to answer those questions”); Megan Ji, Are
Robots Good Fiduciaries? Regulating Robo-Advisors Under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 117 Colum. L. Rev. 1543 (2017) (arguing that robo-advisers are not structurally
incapable of exercising care and calling for a shift in regulatory focus to address robo-advisor
conflicts of interest). See generally INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, RESEARCH REPORT ON
FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES (FINTECH) 24–26, 29–36 (2017), https://www.iosco.org/library/pu
bdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD554.pdf [https://perma.cc/7V6Q-D468] (discussing regulatory
challenges relating to robo-advice); U.S. TREASURY, A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES
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offerings (“ICOs”),22 and crowdfunding.23
While the focus of commentators and scholars worldwide has been on
the rise of innovative and disruptive FinTech startups, incumbents and
BigTechs have been doing what they do best – working quietly to build the
essential infrastructure and scale necessary to counter the start-ups’
strategies, and build on their own advantages in financial resources and
large-scale client access. These efforts, as this Article shows, have created
digital finance leviathans, which now dominate the wealthiest portion of the
financial system: the $89 trillion asset management industry.24
We focus on the asset management industry, in particular, as FinTech
scholarship in this massive sector is particularly underdeveloped. Scholars,
to date, have largely neglected the intersection of finance, regulation, and
technology that is rapidly transforming the global investment fund industry,
America’s financial system, and society more broadly.
This neglect is surprising for two reasons. First, the assets held by
investment funds today exceed and are growing more quickly than those held
by the banking sector: the U.S. mutual fund market grew from $9.6 trillion
to $21.3 trillion from 2008 to 2019.25 In the same period, U.S. bank assets
ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES: NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND INNOVATION 159–64
(2018), https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/2018-07/A-Financial-System-that-Creat
es-Economic-Opportunities---Nonbank-Financi . . . .pdf [https://perma.cc/H8CF-9ND7]
(proposing to streamline licensing in an effort to allow financial planners’ platform-based
financial advice in all U.S. states).
22. See Shaanan Cohney, David A. Hoffman, Jeremy Sklaroff & David Wishnick, Coin-
Operated Capitalism, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 591 (2019) (describing ICO technology and its
limitations); Randolph Robinson, The New Digital Wild West: Regulating the Explosion of
Initial Coin Offerings, 85 TENN. L. REV. 897 (2018) (discussing the impact of the
decentralized nature of blockchain and blockchain’s compatibility with the traditional
securities law framework); Dirk Zetzsche, Ross Buckley, Douglas Arner & Linus Föhr, The
ICO Gold Rush; 60 HARV. INT’L L. J. 267 (2019) (examining the various forms of ICOs and
regulatory challenges and suggesting steps for regulators to take).
23. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 1 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 1 (2012) (analyzing the costs and benefits of crowdfunding and proposing an
exemption that would free crowdfunding from registration requirements); Joseph M. Green
& John F. Coyle, Crowdfunding and the Not-So-Safe SAFE, 102 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 168
(2016) (criticizing the terms of the SAFEs offered by funding portals and offering solutions
to the identified problems); DarianM. Ibrahim, Equity Crowdfunding: AMarket for Lemons?,
100MINN. L. REV. 561 (2015) (defining crowdfunding and its interaction with the JOBS Act);
JasonW. Parsont, Crowdfunding: The Real and the Illusory Exemption, 4 HARV. BUS. L. REV.
281 (2014) (discussing the impact of accredited crowdfunding on retail crowdfunding).
24. BOSTON CONSULTING GROUP, GLOBAL ASSETMANAGEMENT 2020: PROTECT, ADAPT
AND INNOVATE 3 (May 2020), https://image-src.bcg.com/Images/BCG-Global-Asset-
Management-2020-May-2020-r_tcm9-247209.pdf [https://perma.cc/9THU-7GSB].
25. Jennifer Rudden, Total Net Assets of US-Registered Mutual Funds Worldwide from
1998 to 2019, STATISTA (May 8, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/255518/mutual-
fund-assets-held-by-investment-companies-in-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/36YK-A
WRV]; INV. CO. INST., INVESTMENT COMPANY FACTBOOK 56 (60th ed. 2020),
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grew only 62%, from roughly $11 trillion to $17.8 trillion.26 Thus, although
U.S. bank assets exceeded investment funds in 2008, by 2019 the opposite
was true. And by year-end 2019, an estimated 103.9 million individual
Americans in 59.7 million households (46.4% of all U.S. households) owned
mutual funds.27 These investment funds are the central vehicle for people to
manage their life savings for retirement, education, home purchase, and
emergencies. Though banks remain important sources of lending, many of
their loans are in fact funded by investment funds, particularly money market
and bond funds. The investment industry is also a major provider of
payments, competing directly with banks and other payment services.28
Second, the impact of technology is particularly visible. Although
regulatory and financial theory often focus on the role of individuals who
invest in individual stocks, the reality today is dominated by individuals
investing through largely passive funds, which are controlled by a small
number of investment services firms.29 Passive funds invest by allocating
their funds to a pre-defined basket of securities, called an “index.” Their
buying and selling are entirely tech-driven, powered by data, algorithms, and
computer systems. In light of this automation, we provide an answer to one
of the largest questions in corporate governance and investment scholarship:
why do we see rapid growth of passive investment funds? Investor appetite
driven by low fees and diversification, as is often presumed,30 provides only
https://www.ici.org/pdf/2020_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/8878-RFNG].
26. Total Assets, All Commercial Banks, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS,
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TLAACBW027SBOG [https://perma.cc/6G3Z-SE6X] (last
updated Oct. 9, 2020).
27. INV. CO. INST., supra note 25, at ii.
28. Some U.S. money market funds offer access to the investors’ fund by ATM, check,
or bill pay, very similar to more conventional payment systems. See Money Market Fund
Reform, 74 Fed. Reg. 32,688 (July 8, 2009) (“Commonly offered features, such as check-
writing privileges, exchange privileges, and near-immediate liquidity, have contributed to the
popularity of money market funds.”); William A. Birdthistle, Breaking Bucks in Money
Market Funds, 2010WIS. L. REV. 1155, 1161 (stating that “money market funds look and feel
a great deal more like bank savings accounts than the mutual funds they are”).
29. Last year, six of the articles voted for inclusion in the Corporate Practice
Commentator’s top ten corporate and securities articles of 2019, dealt with passive funds or
index investing. The Top 10 Corporate and Securities Articles of 2019, CORPORATEPRACTICE
COMMENTATOR, http://www.professorthompson.com/uploads/2/1/4/7/21478240/best_article
s_list_2019__final_.pdf [https://perma.cc/9F8B-LHMQ]; see also Lucian Bebchuck & Scott
Hirst, The Specter of the Giant Three, 99 B.U. L. REV. 721 (2019) (arguing that the three
largest index fund managers – BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street Global Advisors – will
continue to grow); John C. Coates, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem
of Twelve 2 (Harvard Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 19-07, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/s
ol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3247337 [https://perma.cc/H4TX-994N] (arguing that control of
most public companies will soon be concentrated in the hands of a very small number of
people, i.e. large management companies).
30. See Coates, supra note 29, at 13 (stating that “few active managers will be able to
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one part of the answer. The other – we argue – is technology. Without
digitalization, and their related economies of scope, scale and network
effects analyzed here, the low fees that trigger investor appetite would be
economically unviable. Technology platforms are the most important driver
of growth in the investment-fund – and indeed every – financial industry
today. Thus, we have urgent cause to examine the policy implications of
these systems. By focusing on the technological core of the financial system
and the asset management industry, we thus fill two fundamental gaps in the
literature.
The Article is organized as follows. In Part I, we conceptualize digital
finance platforms and describe the magnitude of the most prominent
examples. We argue that essential functions for investment funds are
increasingly aggregated and performed by digital finance platforms, which
we differentiate from other forms of technological evolution in finance.
Doing so, we introduce three archetypes that play increasingly critical roles
in financial services: (1) the back-office infrastructure that links the largest
asset managers globally (studying the platform appropriately named Aladdin
as the preeminent example); (2) investment platforms that bundle customer
liquidity at the consumer-facing, front-end (such as those operated by
Charles Schwab, Fidelity, J.P. Morgan Chase, Goldman Sachs, and others),
which link public investment funds to an ever-increasing portion of
investments in global financial markets; and (3) comprehensive financial
ecosystems that combine the front-end and back-end of the asset
management industry into a single platform, linking vast numbers of
individuals to finance through technology (with China’s Ant leading the way
and many U.S. examples following suit).
In Part II, we analyze the consequences of categorizing these financial
technology systems as examples of platform industries (demonstrating
network effects and economies of scope and scale), and predict that a small
number of digital finance platforms – or perhaps even only one – is likely to
become dominant in any given sector, integrating more and more functions
of financial intermediation as they grow. We show how technology and
platform concentration challenge the traditional regulatory paradigm for
asset management and investment funds, highlighting the need for a new
approach in order to address the transformation of asset management into a
platform industry.
In Part III, we argue that digital finance platforms currently escape
meaningful regulation, triggering significant risks, because the traditional
paradigm was not designed to address issues arising in the context of a world
convincingly make the case that they can do better than the market, net of fees, for most
indexed fund investors”).
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of increasingly dominant platforms. By scrutinizing national security,
consumer protection, antitrust, systemic risk and cross-border coordination
perspectives, we find traditional securities regulation – with its focus on
disclosure, intermediaries, and distribution – to be ill-equipped to deal with
the new reality presented by increasingly concentrated and dominant
operating systems, platforms, and ecosystems.
In Part IV, we evaluate possible alternative regulatory approaches,
which range from adopting a wait-and-see approach (with or without pro-
innovative tools such as regulatory sandboxes and special charters) to a
strong interventionist approach that would treat these platforms as utilities
(and thus possibly even trigger nationalization). Between those extremes lie
regulatory efforts that could enhance competition and moderate
interventions through indirect regulation by targeting delegation
arrangements and involving a public agency in the partial or full ownership
of each platform. We argue that the optimal approach will turn on the stage
of evolution of the platform: the stronger the position of the platform in any
given financial services market, the stronger the case for an interventionist
approach.
Part V concludes.
I. THERISE OFDIGITAL FINANCE PLATFORMS
Our starting point is a theoretical conceptualization of technology in
asset management, looking at financial operating systems and their evolution
into platforms, contrasting these systems from each other and from existing
discussions of FinTech and financial market infrastructure. This approach
provides the basis for our taxonomy of the evolution of digital finance
platforms in the asset management industry more broadly: back-end systems
(which focus on largely unseen operations), front-end platforms (which
focus on client interactions), and full financial ecosystems (which attempt to
do both).
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A. Conceptualizing Digital Finance Platforms
The theoretical conceptualization of digital finance platforms begins by
crafting a working definition of digital finance platforms (“DFPs”), before
then focusing upon critical distinctions between them and “traditional”
FinTechs and treatments of financial market utilities.
1. Digital Finance Platforms
Digital finance platforms are multilateral IT systems that connect a
network of participating institutions to one another and to the operator of
each system for the purpose of conducting financial transactions. At first
glance, they may appear similar to digital e-commerce platforms, but we
make clear the distinctions infra (at Part I.A.3.). Chief among them, the DFP
does not become a party of the financial transactions performed on it; rather
with multiple applications connected to and run on it, each DFP facilitates or
executes decisions for financial transactions taken by third parties (e.g., the
payer, the investor, the broker, etc.) or separate entities related to the
platform provider.
DFPs can take various legal and organizational forms.31 Examples
include bank or non-bank service entities (where all linked intermediaries
are contracting partners to the service entity) 32 or mutual associations,
typically of financial institutions.33 The DFP can be owned and operated by
one private entity where the entity is in sole34 or dispersed ownership,35 or
mutualized, with the users as members36; we also see public entities (such as
31. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS& INT’LORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 7, at
7 (detailing variety of financial market infrastructure).
32. Visa is structured as a bank while SWIFT is not. See BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN SELECTEDCOUNTRIES 455–57 (2003), https://www.bi
s.org/cpmi/publ/d53.pdf [https://perma.cc/6EA4-WF3G] (describing the structure of
SWIFT).
33. The stock exchanges as constituted until recent decades were the standard example.
Electronic Stock Exchange, ECON. TIMES, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/e/electronic
-stock-exchange/articleshow/51194360.cms?from=mdr [https://perma.cc/TF3T-7T99] (last
updated Feb. 29, 2016).
34. For example, the NYSE today, with the trading conglomerate Intercontinental
Exchange as sole owner. NYSE, INTERCONTINENTAL EXCHANGE, https://www.nyse.com/inde
x [https://perma.cc/5QUB-J37A] (last visited Oct. 19, 2020).
35. For example, Nasdaq, Inc. and Euronext S.A. Investor Relations, NASDAQ,
http://ir.nasdaq.com/ [https://perma.cc/TB32-UX2L] (last visited Oct. 19, 2020); Corporate
Governance, EURONEXT, https://www.euronext.com/en/investor-relations/corporate-governa
nce [https://perma.cc/RP6W-XHA5] (last visited Oct. 19, 2020).
36. For example, the user-owned Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC),
located in New York City, the world’s largest financial value processor. DTCC’s Businesses,
Subsidiaries and Joint Ventures, DTCC, https://www.dtcc.com/about/businesses-and-subsidi
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central banks37) running systemically important DFPs (e.g., real-time gross
settlement (“RTGS”) payment systems).
2. DFPs vs. Financial Market Utilities
A “financial market utility” (“FMU”), as defined by the Bank for
International Settlements and encoded in various parts of U.S. securities and
banking regulation, 38 is “a multilateral system among participating
institutions, including the operator of the system, used for the purposes of
recording, clearing, or settling payments, securities, derivatives, or other
financial transactions.”39 FMU systems in the United States include the
payment system run by the Federal Reserve (the National Settlement
Service40) and Visa, which link banks executing payment transactions from
payer to payee, and connect to the central bank to ensure liquidity. 41
NASDAQ’s systems, similarly, link brokerage firms with traded securities
and their central clearing houses; and the electronic information exchange
and messaging system, SWIFT, connects more than 11,000 financial
institutions around the world. 42 The Depository Trust and Clearing
aries [https://perma.cc/QV58-G3VY] (last visited Oct. 19, 2020).
37. For example, the U.S. Federal Reserve currently functions as operator of the National
Settlement Service (NSS), the Fedwire® Funds Service as well as, together with the Electronic
Payments Network (EPN), the Automated Clearing House (ACH) system, through which
depository institutions send each other batches of electronic credit and debit transfers. The
Federal Reserve committed to develop and operate the FedNow Service, a real-time payment
and settlement service starting operations in 2023. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the
Fed. Rsrv. Sys., Federal Reserve Announces Plan to Develop a New Round-the-Clock Real-
Time Payment and Settlement Service to Support Faster Payments (Aug. 5, 2019),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/other20190805a.htm
[https://perma.cc/E6NK-VR27]. Other examples include the ECB’s payment-vs-delivery
system, Target-2-Securities, and the Bank of England’s CHAPS system. What is TARGET2-
Securities (T2S)?, EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, https://www.ecb.europa.eu/paym/target/t2s/ht
ml/index.en.html [https://perma.cc/77A8-4HW9] (last visited Oct. 19, 2020); CHAPS, BANK
OF ENGLAND, https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/payment-and-settlement/chaps [https://perm
a.cc/H6RK-B89X] (last updated Oct. 5, 2020).
38. See infra note 168 and accompanying text.
39. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS& INT’LORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 7, at 7.
40. See National Settlement Service, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/natl_about.htm [https://perma.cc/JFW7-H
Q5A] (last updated Jan. 15, 2015) (providing information on the National Settlement Service,
a multilateral settlement service offered by the Federal Reserve Banks).
41. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN
THEUNITED STATES (2012) https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d105_us.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2
RK-2JR6]; THE COUNCIL OF INSPECTORS GENERAL OF FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT, AUDIT OF THE
FINANCIAL STABILITYOVERSIGHT COUNCIL’SDESIGNATION OF FINANCIALMARKETUTILITIES
(July 2013), https://www.fdicoig.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CIGFO_AUDIT_71713
.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AYD-SZQG].
42. About Us, SWIFT, https://www.swift.com/about-us [https://perma.cc/2YWA-QGR8]
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Corporation (“DTCC”)43 ensures the transfer of securities and derivatives
among local and global custodians and central securities depositaries.44
DFPs may be a form of FMUs, yet FMUs, in their classic incarnation,
differ from our focus: existing FMUs are too narrow, too mechanical, and
too limited in scope to serve as fully fledged service platform. In particular,
FMUs’ focus has been to make markets and processes more efficient and
secure by targeting pain points – on trust and transaction costs – within the
financial system, while generally avoiding direct contact with the retail client
base. The FMU serves the intermediary so that the intermediary can offer
better products less expensively; hence, profitability is not the main concern
of FMUs.
A DFP, by contrast, aims to provide an entire ecosystem with multiple
services between clients and regulated intermediaries, either directly (where
the client is a DFP client) or indirectly, in an effort to make a profit.45
3. DFPs vs. FinTech
Digital finance platforms possess three critical differences from
traditional FinTechs (typically defined as new challengers focused on
application of technology to some aspect of financial services). First,
archetypal FinTechs focus on disruption – challenging incumbents – while
DFPs bet on an intense form of cooperation with incumbents.46 Second,
most FinTech applications link retail and small and medium enterprises to
FinTech firms.47 DFPs, by contrast, link multiple financial intermediaries
together, in an effort to create an entire financial ecosystem.
Third, in an effort to disintermediate, the most high-profile FinTech
businesses take the form of a marketplace, brokering various services and
goods and taking a commission on it.48 DFPs, by contrast, function as
innovation platforms comprising “a technology, product or service that
serves as a foundation on top of which other firms (loosely organized into an
(last visited Sept. 29, 2020).
43. See supra note 36.
44. See supra note 36.
45. Derryl D’Silva, Zuzana Filková, frank Packer & Siddharth Tiwari, The Design of
Digital Financial Infrastructure: Lessons from India, Bank for Int’l Settlements Papers 6
(2019), https://www.bis.org/publ/bppdf/bispap106.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7RU-B6QD].
46. Douglas W. Arner, Jànos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, FinTech, RegTech and the
Reconceptualization of Financial Regulation, 37 NW. J. INT’L L & BUS. 371, 381 (2017);
supra note 45 at 6–7.
47. See supra note 21 to 23 and accompanying text.
48. See PETERC.EVANS&ANNABELLEGAWER, THERISE OF THEPLATFORMENTERPRISE:
A GLOBAL SURVEY 14 (2016), https://www.thecge.net/app/uploads/2016/01/PDF-WEB-
Platform-Survey_01_12.pdf [https://perma.cc/8MC2-DYJU] (stating that of the 176 platform
firms that were surveyed in 2015 globally, 160 platforms were transaction platforms).
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innovative ecosystem) develop complementary technologies, products or
services.”49 A DFP is at its core similar to Apple, Microsoft, SAP, Oracle,
and Intel, all offering the core innovation platforms on which various
applications run. DFPs thus “establish a core of tools and standards that
serve as a foundation for third-party software or content,”50 where content
can include data of all kinds and data-analytic tools, as well as contracting,
execution, and settlement systems.
B. Aladdin: The Paradigmatic Back-end Platform
Currently, Blackrock’s Aladdin is the platform with by far the greatest
impact on asset management.
1. Aladdin’s Activities
Aladdin – short for “Asset, Liability, Debt and Derivative Investment
Network” – is at its core a technology tool that allows asset managers to
“communicate effectively, address problems quickly, and make informed
decisions at every step of the investment process.”51 BlackRock started to
develop Aladdin, called “one of the earliest fintechs,”52 for its own portfolio
and risk management, investment processes, and trade execution in 1993.
From there, Aladdin moved into automatic position-keeping, record-
keeping, and the control of risk exposure. 53 In 1994, BlackRock was
engaged to price and manage General Electric’s complex bond portfolio, and
integrated a broker-dealer system into Aladdin, allowing for automatic
portfolio rebalancing by the mid-1990s.54 Aladdin’s capabilities became
known outside of the asset management community during the 2008 Global
Financial Crisis, when governments globally struggled to evaluate the risk
49. Id. at 9.
50. Daniel Haberly et al., Asset Management as a Digital Platform Industry: A Global
Financial Network Perspective, 106 GEOFORUM 167, 168 (2019).
51. Aladdin® Enterprise Overview, BLACKROCK, https://www.BlackRock.com/aladdin/
offerings/aladdin-overview [https://perma.cc/F5EG-SV5Z] (last visited Sept. 29, 2020). See
also The Monolith and the Markets; BlackRock, THE ECONOMIST (Dec. 7, 2013),
https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A351771715/AONE?u=upenn_main&sid=AONE&xid=16bd
353d [https://perma.cc/SCS5-CUEZ] (describing the asset management company BlackRock,
and its trading platform, Aladdin).
52. See Will Dunn, Meet Aladdin, the computer “more powerful than traditional
politics,” NEW STATESMAN (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.newstatesman.com/spotlight/
2018/04/meet-aladdin-computer-more-powerful-traditional-politics [https://perma.cc/3QNZ-
9T5T] (citing Jody Kochansky, BlackRock’s managing director and head of the Aladdin
Product Group, a division of BlackRock).
53. See Id.
54. See Id.
2020] DIGITAL FINANCE PLATFORMS 289
exposure underlying the portfolios of global investment banks. By excluding
the investment banks themselves, due to their obvious conflicts, and by using
the reach of Aladdin’s data and analytical tools, BlackRock was able to
execute the multi-billion-dollar refinancing transactions necessary to prevent
the U.S. financial system from collapsing,55 turning BlackRock into “the
leading manager of Washington’s bailout of Wall Street.”56
The platform has since expanded into risk analysis and other parts of
the investment process, and evolved into an end-to-end investment platform
that, according to BlackRock, “combines sophisticated risk analytics with
comprehensive portfolio management, trading and operations tools on a
single platform to power informed decision-making, effective risk
management, efficient trading and operational scale.” 57 Today, serving
clients that range from private to institutional funds, “Aladdin is an operating
system for investment managers that seeks to connect the information,
people and technology needed to manage money in real time.”58
2. The Power and Reach of Aladdin
Aladdin is a hosted service: the technical infrastructure, system
administration, and interfacing with data providers and industry utilities are
operated by BlackRock’s IT and technical staff of more than 600, who focus
on creating data and analyses for clients.59
The scale of Aladdin is undeniably impressive, inspiring descriptions
like “the Android of finance”60 or “Amazon of Wall Street.”61 More than
$20 trillion in assets, around ten percent of the world’s financial assets,
depend on Aladdin’s services – this figure is equal to four times the value of
all cash in the world,62 the annual GDP of the United States, or the total U.S.
stock market capitalization. 63 Approximately 55,000 investment
55. Id.
56. Suzanna Andrews, Larry Fink’s $12 Trillion Shadow, VANITY FAIR (Mar. 2, 2010),
https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2010/04/fink-201004 [https://perma.cc/H4NB-PF29].
57. Solutions: Aladdin®, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/institutions/en-us/sol
utions/aladdin [https://perma.cc/D4VW-HTNR] (last visited Oct. 10, 2020).
58. See Aladdin® Enterprise Overview, supra note 51.
59. See Aladdin® Enterprise Overview, supra note 51.
60. Erik Schatzker, Larry Fink Q&A: “I don’t identify as powerful”, BLOOMBERG (Apr.
18, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2017-blackrock-larry-fink-interview/
[https://perma.cc/BTE4-F5A2].
61. Antoine Gara, BlackRock’s Edge: Why Technology Is Creating the Amazon of Wall
Street, FORBES (Dec. 26, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/antoinegara/2017/12/19/blackr
ocks-edge-why-technology-is-creating-a-6-trillion-amazon-of-wall-street/#58212ce0561b
[https://perma.cc/966E-SQ9C].
62. Dunn, supra note 52.
63. Haberly, et al., supra note 50, at 172.
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professionals globally rely on Aladdin and Aladdin Wealth.64 More than
1,000 internal and external developers work continuously on enhancing its
services. 65 Overall, Aladdin hosts the portfolios of 210 institutions
worldwide, including some of the largest asset owners (e.g., California State
Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS)) and competitors including
Schroders and Vanguard).66
Aladdin had its origin in risk management, and in that arena, it remains
particularly effective. It became a powerful tool through its early
introduction of Monte Carlo simulations. These replicate the
unpredictability of the real world within a deterministic order of
mathematics, by using random numbers rather than data reflecting past
events. These simulations produce more comprehensive and more granular
risk reports than other systems.67 Today, in its risk management capacity,
Aladdin monitors more than 2,000 “risk factors each day – from interest rates
to currencies – and performs 5,000 portfolio stress tests and 180 million
option-adjusted calculations each week.”68
3. Aladdin’s Advantage: Data Control
Aladdin’s greatest competitive advantage is its control over financial
data. Insights from other network and data economies demonstrate that
ownership of data produces economies of scale: the more data Aladdin can
collect and analyze, the better the services Aladdin can provide to the
portfolios of BlackRock and its clients. This data-driven scale inheres in the
network effects and scale economics embedded in software generally, where
the costs of all design, development, and coding are borne by the first
version, while all subsequent copies can be produced at practically zero
further cost.69 The data-driven scale also underlies its evolution into a digital
finance platform.
64. Aladdin® Enterprise Overview, supra note 51.
65. Aladdin® Enterprise Overview, supra note 51.
66. Amy Whyte Can Anyone Bury Aladdin, INST. INVESTOR (Oct. 1, 2018),
https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/article/b1b672fxttfp1l/Can-Anyone-Bury-BlackRock
[https://perma.cc/89AR-NDMZ].
67. See Dunn, supra note 52.
68. Benefits for Risk Managers, BLACKROCK, https://www.BlackRock.com/aladdin/ben
efits/risk-managers [https://perma.cc/94GZ-DEPP] (last visited Sept. 29, 2020).
69. Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust in Software Markets, in COMPETITION,
INNOVATION AND THEMICROSOFTMONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THEDIGITALMARKETPLACE 34–
35(Jeffrey A. Eisenbach & Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999); Richard A. Posner, Antitrust in
the New Economy 3 (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 106,
2000).
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4. Aladdin’s Competitors
Aladdin is not short of competitors, though most are unknown to the
millions of retail investors who rely upon their services. Copenhagen-based
SimCorp, for example, established its Dimension platform as a challenger,
claiming that Dimension would compete with Aladdin on a global basis.70
Other providers of risk-data modelling include MSCI Barra, Bloomberg, and
Refinitiv.71 When Refinitiv was recently acquired by the London Stock
Exchange (“LSE”), the LSE’s CEO justified this $27 billion acquisition by
stressing – consistent with our analysis – that “data capabilities will define
the success of financial market infrastructure business.”72 The goal is clear:
to develop the LSE, a financial market infrastructure, into a digital finance
platform. J.P. Morgan Chase is also now licensing its trading and investment
analytics platform, Athena, to third parties.73 We believe this move to be an
effort to capitalize on the trading and investment data created by clients of
J.P. Morgan Chase’s $25 trillion custody business and simultaneously to
defend their clients against data-only competitors.74
C. Front-End Investment Platforms
If Aladdin is fundamentally about integrating active asset managers,
data, analytics, and market infrastructure in order to enhance efficiency and
performance, then investment platforms are fundamentally about building an
underlying operating system to link individual investors to information and
products. The products are typically investment funds – increasingly passive
investment funds – such as the ever-growing universe of exchange-traded
funds (“ETFs”), which hold $6.1 trillion75 in U.S. and international markets.
70. Whyte, supra note 66.
71. See Dunn, supra note 52 (citing Aladdin’s Jody Kochansky who mentions MSCI
Barra and Bloomberg as risk model providers that may have “still greater influence” than
Aladdin);Model RiskManagement, REFINITIV, https://www.refinitiv.com/en/products/connec
ted-risk-management/model-risk-management# [https://perma.cc/MHC3-V4D6] (last visited
Oct. 19, 2020).
72. Philip Stafford, LSE needs to Beat Bloomberg at its Own Game, FIN. TIMES (Aug. 19,
2019), https://www.ft.com/content/bcd57f62-bda1-11e9-b350-db00d509634e [https://perma.
cc/U878-5VP8].
73. Hugh Son, JP Morgan is Letting Clients Access Its Trading Software in a Glimpse of
Wall Street’s Tech Future, CNBC (Nov. 5, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/11/05/jp-
morgan-selling-trading-software-in-glimpse-of-wall-streets-future.html [https://perma.cc/5U
8U-XX5D].
74. J.P. Morgan Sells Trading Software to Custody and Fund Services Clients,
J.P.MORGAN (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.jpmorgan.com/country/AU/en/detail/1320570868
855 [https://perma.cc/73K6-KXJD].
75. M. Szmigiera, Worldwide ETF Assets Under Management 2003-2019, STATISTA
292 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OFBUSINESS LAW [Vol. 23:1
1. Incumbents
We observe particularly noticeable growth in the scale and size of
certain front-end platforms in the fund industry, where major fund
distribution platforms have expanded.76 For instance, fund management
giant Fidelity provides its clients an investment platform through which they
can steer their investment streams, analyze their portfolios, and access
advisory services by Fidelity, including receiving a “retirement score in 60
seconds.”77 Another fund management giant, Vanguard, provides a system
for accessing Vanguard’s universe of passive funds. Services for
professional investors include the creation and evaluation of client
portfolios, a product comparison with Vanguard and non-Vanguard
products, as well as the provision of a model portfolio – in short, robo-
advisory services.78 Similar front-end systems are being developed by
broker-dealers including Charles Schwab, whose platform provides access
to Schwab’s and others’ financial products, advisory services, and analytical
tools. Schwab’s platform stresses the fact that it charges “$0 commissions
on online stock, ETF, and options trades” and has “2,000+ commission-free
ETFs and 4,000+ no-load, no-transaction-fee mutual funds,” aimed at cost-
sensitive clients. 79 Through its merger with TD Ameritrade, 80 the joint
Schwab-TD-platform promises to expand its reach over retail users and
assets dramatically.
J.P. Morgan Chase has acquired a number of innovative investment
firms,81 combining them with its own operations to form the new platform,
(Feb. 24, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/224579/worldwide-etf-assets-under-
management-since-1997/#:~:text=The%20statistic%20presents%20the%20development,app
roximately%206.18%20trillion%20U.S.%20dollars [https://perma.cc/99E7-QQ34].
76. On the emerging trend to fund distribution platforms, see INT’L ORG. OF SEC.
COMM’NS, RESEARCH REPORT ON FINANCIAL TECHNOLOGIES (FINTECH) 22, 25, 68 (2017),
https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD554.pdf [https://perma.cc/7V6Q-D468
] (discussing fund distribution platforms).
77. FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/ [https://perma.cc/2C2Z-VLRV] (last visited
Sept. 29, 2020).
78. VANGUARD, https://advisors.vanguard.com/advisors-home [https://perma.cc/NQN9-
K7MB] (last visited Sept. 29, 2020).
79. Why Schwab: How We Compare, SCHWAB, https://www.schwab.com/public/schwab
/investing/why_choose_schwab/compare_us [https://perma.cc/T9RC-ZFV5] (last visited
Sept. 29, 2020).
80. Maggie Fitzgerald, Shares of Charles Schwab jump after sources say DOJ approves
deal for TD Ameritrade, CNBC (June 4, 2020, 8:58 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/06/04/s
hares-of-charles-schwab-jump-after-sources-say-doj-approves-deal-for-td-ameritrade.html
[https://perma.cc/PQ4S-4DWM].
81. The You Invest formation came on top of a number of start-up acquisitions in the
payment sector that serve to strengthen J.P. Morgan’s technology core, including InstMed, a
solutions provider for health care related payments for more than $500 million in June 2019
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You Invest.82 The services, again, include financial products, advice, and
analysis. As a bank, J.P. Morgan can expand its system to be a full-service
digital finance platform, covering deposit, lending, payment, investment,
trading, and insurance. It also provides access to J.P. Morgan’s lending and
asset management operations to support the firm’s business clients.83
Another U.S. firm particularly active in creating a front-end platform is
Goldman Sachs. Goldman used the online deposit platform, bank license,
customers, and $16 billion deposits from its 2016 acquisition of GE Capital
Bank to create its digital platform, Marcus.84 And by way of “acqui-hire,” it
added a small business lending P2P team from Bond Street Marketplace in
2017; the consumer FinTech team from credit card startup, Final, in January
2018; and Clarity Money with its personal financial management tool as a
mobile storefront and onemillion customers for $100million in April 2018.85
In addition, Goldman acquired the wealth platform United Capital for
$750 million, completing the cornerstones of a digital platform.86 Although
the United Capital acquisition may seem unrelated to Marcus, Goldman’s
2019 press release reveals an intention to a digital finance platform:
and, in an effort to improve services for its 4 million small business clients, WePay, a
competitor to PayPal and Stripe, for approximately $220 million in 2017. About, INSTAMED,
https://www.instamed.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/PJK4-NXJS] (last visited Oct. 20, 2020);
About Us, WEPAY, https://go.wepay.com/about-wepay/ [https://perma.cc/99DU-VS87] (last
visited Oct. 20, 2020).
82. Overview: You Invest by J.P. Morgan, CHASE, https://www.chase.com/personal/inv
estments/you-invest [https://perma.cc/W425-UR5H] (last visited Sept. 29, 2020).
83. You Invest Overview, CHASE, https://www.chase.com/personal/investments/you-
invest [https://perma.cc/W425-UR5H] (last visited Oct. 1, 2020).
84. MARCUS, https://www.marcus.com/us/en [https://perma.cc/BHY8-AVKM] (last
visited Oct. 1, 2020); Marcus by Goldman Sachs Leverages Technology and Legacy of
Financial Expertise in Dynamic Consumer Finance Platform, GOLDMANSACHS, https://www.
goldmansachs.com/our-firm/history/moments/2016-marcus.html [https://perma.cc/YU7F-
7ZRY] (last visited Oct. 20, 2020); Press Release, Goldman Sachs, Goldman Sachs Bank
USA Completes Acquisition of Online Deposit Platform from GE Capital Bank (Apr. 18,
2016), https://www.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/press-releases/archived/2016/annou
ncement-gs-bank.html [https://perma.cc/4BRH-4WSW].
85. Peter Rudegeair & Liz Hoffman, Goldman Nabs FinTech Group in Push to Boost
Online Lending, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 13, 2017, 5:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/goldm
an-nabs-fintech-group-in-push-to-boost-online-lending-1505337060 [https://perma.cc/BE69
-JTEC]; Ainsley Harris, Goldman Sachs Acquires Team behind Credit Card Startup Final,
FAST COMPANY (Jan. 30, 2018) https://www.fastcompany.com/40523758/goldman-sachs-
buys-credit-card-startup-final [https://perma.cc/D7GK-4RRD]; Luisa Beltran, Goldman
closes buy of Clarity Money, PE HUB (Apr. 15, 2018), https://www.pehub.com
/2018/04/goldman-closes-buy-clarity-money/ [https://perma.cc/SM7N-PV8G].
86. Goldman Sachs to Buy Wealth Manager United Capital for $750 Million, REUTERS
(May 16, 2019, 9:11 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-unitedcapitalfinancial-m-a-gol
dmansac/goldman-sachs-to-buy-wealth-manager-united-capital-for-750-million-idUSKCN1
SM1IH [https://perma.cc/3FTT-3ARJ].
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United Capital will enhance Goldman Sachs’ ability to cover a
broad range of clients in Ayco’s growing corporate client base
with financial planning solutions through an advisor-led, tech-
enabled platform with considerable scale and geographic
footprint. These efforts will complement the digitally-empowered
consumer platform for individuals from Marcus by Goldman
Sachs, and will ultimately provide a full-range of services across
the wealth spectrum.87
Fidelity and Vanguard are, at their core, investment advisers (i.e.,
managers of mutual funds), Charles Schwab is originally a broker-dealer,
J.P. Morgan a bank, and Goldman Sachs – until 2008 – an investment bank.
Notwithstanding these entirely different core businesses, evolutionary
trajectories, and regulatory regimes, the digital finance platforms of all five
look remarkably similar. We discuss this important convergence in further
detail below.88
2. The Size and Growth of Investment Platforms
The sheer size and growth of Charles Schwab, Fidelity, and Vanguard
are impressive, particularly relative to other parts of the economy:
Vanguard’s assets under management have dramatically increased to $6.2
trillion today from $1.6 trillion as of December 31, 2013 – a 288% increase89
– with $3 trillion of that growth due to flows into passive index funds.90 In
the period from December 31, 2013, to June 30, 2020, Fidelity generated
638% growth (from $1.3 trillion to $8.3 trillion). 91 Though smaller,
Schwab’s 78% increase in assets under management over six years (from
$2.3 trillion to $4.1 trillion) 92 is still remarkable. Schwab’s recent TD
87. Press Release, Goldman Sachs, Goldman Sachs Announces Acquisition of United
Capital (May 16, 2019), https://www.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/press-releases/archi
ved/2019/announcement-16-may-2019.html [https://perma.cc/AR7G-SKLK].
88. See infra Part III.
89. See JonathanWilliams, AUMGrowth at 10 Largest Fund Managers Outstrips Sector
– Top 400, IPE.COM (June 10, 2013), https://www.ipe.com/top-400/aum-growth-at-10-
largest-fund-managers-outstrips-sector-top-400/53219.article [https://perma.cc/SV6H-8FX
D] (showing data for 2013); Fast Facts About Vanguard, VANGUARD, https://about.vanguar
d.com/who-we-are/fast-facts/ [https://perma.cc/N26S-5H24] (last visited Sept. 29, 2020).
90. Landon Thomas Jr., Vanguard is Growing Faster Than Everybody Else Combined,
CNBC (Apr. 17, 2017, 12:12 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/16/vanguard-is-growing-
faster-than-everybody-else-combined.html [https://perma.cc/W2GP-YB28].
91. SeeWilliams, supra note 89; FIDELITY, https://www.fidelity.com/about-fidelity/our-
company#ourcompanybynumberstitleNCL [https://perma.cc/W5H7-HVES] (last updated
June 30, 2020).
92. See Press Release, Charles Schwab, Schwab Reports Fourth Quarter Net Income Up
51% Year-Over-Year (Jan. 16, 2014), https://pressroom.aboutschwab.com/press-releases/pre
ss-release/2014/Schwab-Reports-Fourth-Quarter-Net-Income-Up-51-Year-Over-Year/defaul
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Ameritrade acquisition added another twelve million customers and $1.2
trillion in assets, resulting in total assets of $5.3 trillion (and total growth of
130% as compared to six years ago).93 Together, Schwab/TD Ameritrade
serve a total of more than twenty-six million customers, Vanguard more than
thirty million customers, and Fidelity more than thirty-two million
customers.94
These huge numbers have prompted concerns about undue
concentration of equities in the hands of such a small number of institutional
investors95 as well as increasing industry concentration.96 These concerns
reflect the cost sensitivity of investors as a major cause of this exceptional
concentration, yet fail to analyze why Vanguard and others are able to offer
such funds at very competitive terms. We argue that the effectiveness of
their underlying digital finance platforms explains much of the success of
these entities.
3. The Investment Platform Advantage: Liquidity Control
Though driven by a desire to monopolize critical data, the major
advantage of investment platforms stems from their aggregation of liquidity:
t.aspx [https://perma.cc/JH7E-KHEE] (detailing figures per Dec. 31, 2013); Press Release,
Charles Schwab, Schwab Reports Second Quarter Earnings Per Share Of $.48, Including $.06
Per Share Of Acquisition-Related Expenses (July 16, 2020), https://content.schwab.com/web
/retail/public/about-schwab/schw_q2_2020_earnings_release.PDF [https://perma.cc/Z8C3-5
UNP] (detailing figures per June 30, 2020).
93. TD Ameritrade to Announce Fiscal Third Quarter Earnings, TD AMERITRADE (July
7, 2020), https://www.amtd.com/news-and-stories/press-releases/press-release-details/2020/
TD-Ameritrade-to-Announce-Fiscal-Third-Quarter-Earnings/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/
96JU-MXVF]; Charles Schwab Corporation to Acquire TD Ameritrade, TD AMERITRADE
(Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.amtd.com/news-and-stories/press-releases/press-release-detail
s/2019/The-Charles-Schwab-Corporation-to-Acquire-TD-Ameritrade/default.aspx [https://p
erma.cc/EC6X-862H].
94. See supra notes 87, 88, 90, and 91; Corporate Statistics, FIDELITY, https://www.fidel
ity.com/bin-public/060_www_fidelity_com/documents/about-fidelity/corporate-statistics-inf
ographic.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3WQ-5SKA] (last visited Oct. 9, 2020).
95. See supra note 29 (supplying a corporate governance perspective). See also Int’l
Monetary Fund, Global Financial Stability Report: Navigating Monetary Policy Challenges
and Managing Risks (Apr. 2015), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2016/1
2/31/Navigating-Monetary-Policy-Challenges-and-Managing-Risks [https://perma.cc/39FS-
LANX] (offering a market stability perspective); Sophie Steins Bisschop, Martijn Boermans
& Jon Frost, European bond markets: Do illiquidity and concentration aggravate price
shocks?, 141 Econ. Letters 141, 143 (2016) (analyzing the effects of market liquidity and
ownership structure on European bond markets).
96. Kenechukwu Anadu et al., The Shift from Active to Passive Investing: Risks to
Financial Stability? 16–20 (Fed. Rsrv. Bank of Bos., Working Paper SRA 18-04, 2020),
https://www.bostonfed.org/publications/risk-and-policy-analysis/2018/the-shift-from-active-
to-passive-investing.aspx [https://perma.cc/4A8J-8FVY].
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that is, they essentially control the flow of their clients’ money. Clients are
attracted by the prospect of low fees for transactions and advice, and
willingly relinquish control over their asset streams to the platform
providers, which then control the liquidity to negotiate advantageous
contract terms with custodians, other advisers, broker-dealers, and stock
exchanges. The main threat investment platforms employ – to ensure
optimal terms for themselves and their clients – is not necessarily the threat
of defection to a different service provider; rather with sufficient clients on
the platform, the platform provider itself can offer custodial, advisory,
broker-dealer, and even exchange services. The true value, hence, is their
clients’ bundled spending power that can be employed either to extract better
terms from counterparties or to assume the counterparty’s functions if the
counterparty does not give in to the investment platform’s pressure. In this
way, investment platforms squeeze the profit margins out of the back-end of
the investment chain and counter the threat of getting squeezed and
automated away by back-end platforms like Aladdin gradually approaching
their clients by integrating ever more front-end institutions. For this strategy
to succeed, client numbers and asset streams on the front-end are crucial,
which explains the universal race for client numbers and asset size.
D. Financial Ecosystems
While Aladdin’s strength lies in data control, and investment platforms
aggregate data, investments, and liquidity control, some digital finance
platforms – which we call financial ecosystems – benefit from the control of
both data and liquidity via the provision of comprehensive front-to-back
financial services. That is, they cover the full value chain of asset
management, from customers’ payment and custodial accounts to broker-
dealer, advisory, and exchange services. While many incumbents such as
BlackRock and Goldman Sachs are seeking to pursue this strategy (see infra,
at Part I.E.), the big platform technology firms (“BigTechs”) are leading the
way, particularly Ant Group.
1. The Ant Ecosystem
Though not well known in the United States, the most extensive
financial ecosystem has been created by Ant Group, the financial arm of the
Chinese BigTech, Alibaba.97 Developed originally as a support function for
97. See FIN. STABILITY BD., BIGTECH IN FINANCE: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND
POTENTIAL FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS 4–11 (Dec. 9, 2019), https://www.fsb.org/wp
-content/uploads/P091219-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/63W9-6MSY] (discussing Ant’s role in
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e-commerce in an emerging environment (Alipay), Ant (until July 2020,
named Ant Financial) today comprises a payment system, a custody function
for its clients, robo-advisory and asset management services, and credit,
investment, and insurance products of its own and other firms. 98 A
particularly interesting service within the Ant ecosystem is the moneymarket
mutual fund Yu’e Bao, which at its largest reached $250 billion in assets
from 600 million clients, making it by far the world’s largest money market
fund, at the time outdistancing the second-largest fund of this kind by a
margin of $100 billion.99 Most recently, Ant has entered into a joint venture
with Vanguard to combine Vanguard’s investment platform and passive
investment fund ecosystem with the Ant / Alibaba ecosystem.100 Ant has
also become one of the largest providers of both consumer and SME lending
in China.101
Ant’s objective is to provide a comprehensive ecosystem that allows
customers to buy whatever they want through e-commerce platforms and
physical and virtual merchants throughout the world via Alipay, which now
has more than 700 million Chinese active users.102 Those individuals and
firms can, in turn, use the funds in Ant’s Alipay system for other payments
or investment, earning attractive returns through money market funds, an
increasing range of ETFs, and other investment products including
insurance.
Ant funds itself through fees, 103 sales of data, 104 and borrowing in
finance); Jon Frost, Leonardo Gambacorta, Yi Huang, Hyun Song Shin & Pablo Zbinden,
BigTech and The Changing Structure of Financial Intermediation 7–10 (BIS, Working Paper
No. 779, 2019), https://www.bis.org/publ/work779.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3RX-8STN]
(detailing the impact of Ant on the Chinese credit market).
98. See FIN. STABILITYBD, supra note 97.
99. World’s No. 1 Money Market Fund Shrinks By $120 Billion, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 5,
2019, 6:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-05/world-s-no-1-mone
y-market-fund-shrinks-by-120-billion-in-china [https://perma.cc/QYV2-GBLW].
100. Reuters Staff, China’s Ant Financial, Vanguard Form Shanghai-Based Venture:
Government Records, REUTERS (June 10, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vanguar
d-china/chinas-ant-financial-vanguard-form-shanghai-based-venture-government-records-
idUSKCN1TB178 [https://perma.cc/KF4J-L2PT].
101. See Stella Yifan Xie, A $7 Credit Limit: Jack Ma’s Ant Lures Hundreds of Millions
of Borrowers,WALLST. J. (Dec. 8, 2019, 8:33 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-7-credit-
limit-jack-mas-ant-lures-hundreds-of-millions-of-borrowers-11575811989 [https://perma.cc/
7NK9-HJRC] (stating that Ant’s “mega microlending business has ballooned by offering tiny
loans of up to $7, turning Ant “into one of China’s largest providers of personal credit lines”).
102. China’s Alipay NowHas Over 900mUsers Worldwide,CHINADAILY (Nov. 30, 2018,
10:34 AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201811/30/WS5c00a1d3a310eff30328c073.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/9996-9RAU].
103. Ryan McMorrow, Nian Liu & Sherry Fei Ju, The Transformation of Ant Financial,
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/c636a22e-dd3f-403e-a72d-c3ffb375
459c [https://perma.cc/6XG6-46AF].
104. Gabriel Wildau and Yizhen Jia, China Fintech Lending Boom Fuels Risks of Data
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China’s Interbank Bond Market, China’s electronic bond and money market
platform. It then lends to individuals to help them buy products through
Alibaba and other vendors while also providing credit to businesses to enable
them to expand their operations, income, and profits. Ant in turn securitizes
those loans and is one of the largest issuers of asset-backed securities in
China, which it in turn sells to investors in the Interbank Bond Market.105
Ant also now sells insurance, including a new mutual-aid platform that
gained one hundred million customers in a year.106 The funds paid in premia
are of course invested via its platform to generate investment returns to
support payouts. The Ant ecosystem thus covers all aspects of finance – Ant
calls it “Digital Life” – from hundreds of millions of individuals and firms
through its financial ecosystem, integrating directly with third-company
providers and funding commercial borrowers both directly and through the
capital markets.107
2. Size and Scope of Ant
Ant is anything but a financial ant – it is one of the highest valued
financial companies in the world. At its height in November 2020,
immediately prior to its planned IPO in Hong Kong and Shanghai, it had a
valuation of $280 billion. Had that IPO taken place, it would have been the
world’s largest, raising $35 billion.108 For comparison, this size would have
Theft, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/2d2f6012-d4dc-11e7-8c9a-
d9c0a5c8d5c9 [https://perma.cc/FS79-5HWK].
105. Daniel Ren, Ant Financial to Issue China’s First Security Backed by Loans to Online
Retailers, SOUTH CHINAMORNING POST (Mar. 16, 2018) https://www.scmp.com/business/co
mpanies/article/2137594/ant-financial-issue-chinas-first-security-backed-loans-online
[https://perma.cc/9T8C-SHVA]; ORIENT CAPITAL RESEARCH, ANT FINANCIAL’SAGGRESSIVE
STRATEGY (Mar. 19, 2018), http://www.orientcapitalresearch.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/
09/Ants-Aggressive-Strategy-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/TQ8P-NEYF].
106. Georgina Lee Ant Financial’s Mutual-Aid Platform Xiang Hu Bao Attracts 100
Million Users, Boosts Insurers’ Sales by 60 per cent in First Year, SOUTH CHINAMORNING
POST (Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/3039554/ant-finan
cials-mutual-aid-platform-xiang-hu-bao-attracts-100 [https://perma.cc/G58M-CY4U].
107. Digital Daily Life, ANTGROUP, https://www.antgroup.com/en/digital-life [https://per
ma.cc/4PVB-TX3C] (last visited Oct. 20, 2020).
108. SeeAnais Concepcion,HowAnt Financial Became the Largest FinTech in theWorld,
APPLICO (Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.applicoinc.com/blog/ant-financial-services-platform-la
rgest-FinTech-in-world/ [https://perma.cc/KB9R-LAYG]; Nisha Gopalan, Ant Will Have an
Elephant-Sized Coming Out Party, BLOOMBERG (July 21, 2020, 12:51 AM), https://www.blo
omberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-07-21/ant-will-have-an-elephant-sized-coming-out-party
?srnd=premium-asia&sref=lP8hg7Cm [https://perma.cc/SZ9E-6CV3]; Jack Ma’s Ant Group
Raises IPO Valuation Target to $280 Billion, BLOOMBERGNEWS (Oct. 16, 2020), https://ww
w.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-10-16/jack-ma-s-ant-group-raises-ipo-valuation-target
-to-280-billion [https://perma.cc/8LA6-2DX2]; Lulu Yilun Chen, Jack Ma’s Ant Set to Raise
$35 Billion in Biggest-Ever IPO, YAHOO FIN. (Oct. 26, 2020), https://finance.yahoo.com/new
2020] DIGITAL FINANCE PLATFORMS 299
given Ant approximately the same market capitalization as PayPal, about
two-thirds that of JP Morgan, about one-third that of Facebook, or about one
fifth that of Google, though Ant and Alibaba combined would not be far
behind these US companies. Amazon and Microsoft, however, dwarf
everything else, a point we will return to in Part IV. In 2018, Ant raised $14
billion in venture capital financing, or 35% of all VC funding worldwide that
year, more than all U.S. FinTech companies combined. 109 Alipay, its
payments services, had more than 1.2 billion active users worldwide as of
June 30, 2019 and a share in the Chinese payments market of 54.2%,
executing more than $16 trillion in transactions,110 equivalent to four times
China’s nominal GDP.111
The reach of Ant extends beyond payments. It “also owns and operates
an open insurance marketplace with over 80 insurance companies on the
platform that reaches over 400 million users. . . . All of China’s 116 mutual
fund managers are on the platform that reaches 180 million users.”112
The potential scope of economic and financial disruption caused by a
failure or hacking of Ant’s platform is immense, and these concerns – among
others – led to a decision to subject it to increased regulation, causing the
IPO in November 2020 to be suspended indefinitely by mainland Chinese
and Hong Kong regulators.113
3. Liquidity and Data Control
When compared to back-end and front-end systems, the striking factor
about Ant is that it exercises control over clients’ liquidity and data.
s/jack-ma-ant-raises-34-113651223.html [https://perma.cc/GTQ4-PRXB].
109. Anna Irrera, FinTech Companies Raised a Record $39.6 billion in 2018, REUTERS
(Jan. 19, 2019, 12:39 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-fintech-funding/fintech-comp
anies-raised-a-record-396-billion-in-2018-research-idUSKCN1PN0EL [https://perma.cc/28
QF-2MSQ].
110. Raymond Zhong, Ant Group, the Alibaba Payment Affiliate, Files to Go Public, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/25/technology/ant-alibaba-ipo-fili
ng.html [https://perma.cc/C93B-9N6R].
111. See CBNEditor, Q2 Mobile Payments Transaction Volume in China Rises 22.6%
YoY: iResearch Report, CHINABANK.NEWS (Oct. 17 2019), http://www.chinabankingnews.co
m/2019/10/17/q2-mobile-payments-transaction-volume-in-china-rises-22-6-yoy-iresearch-
report/ [https://perma.cc/K8P2-KLZZ]; Alipay reports 1.2 bln users, XINHUANET (Oct. 1,
2019, 3:00 PM), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-10/01/c_138440413.htm [https://p
erma.cc/Y9UW-SY6V]; China Nominal GDP, CEIC, https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator
/china/nominal-gdp [https://perma.cc/VT22-7WTB] (last visited Oct. 22 2020).
112. Concepcion, supra note 108.
113. See David Scanlon, Everything You Need to Know About Ant’s Pulled IPO,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-04/here-s-
everything-you-need-to-know-about-ant-s-pulled-ipo?sref=lP8hg7Cm [https://perma.cc/35Y
N-W7MR] (summarizing key elements and reports).
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Employing its data power, Ant can offer – where profitable, based on client
and transaction data – any financial services to any client at any time.
Employing its liquidity power, Ant can push insurance companies or asset
management firms for rebates, discounts, and commissions. That liquidity
power means that no financial services firm targeting the Chinese market can
afford to be removed from Ant’s platform.
Ant can capitalize on the liquidity and data control even where it
forgoes the provision of financial services (which would come most often
with capital requirements and strict regulation). This flexibility explains
why Ant’s current focus is on providing a mere platform on which others can
offer their services, similar to the Apple App store, but focusing on finance.
4. The Ant Clones: The Ecosystem Business Model
Unsurprisingly, in light of the high value assigned by investors to large
financial ecosystems like that of Ant, a range of firms are seeking to mimic
Ant’s business model. For example, Charles River – a competitor of Aladdin
– has joined with State Street to deliver the “first-ever global, front-to-back,
client servicing platform from a single provider.”114 This claim is obviously
ill-founded given its belated emulation of Ant’s ecosystem, not to mention
the competing financial ecosystems provided by Tencent115 and Baidu in
China which – even though much smaller than that of Ant – are giants in
terms of user numbers.116 Ping An, the world’s largest insurance company,
is building a similar integrated ecosystem for its 570+ million internet users,
integrating finance, insurance, health care, and property, following the adage
“one customer, multiple products, and one-stop services.”117
All manners of U.S. financial institutions are attempting to follow Ant’s
example to establish and expand financial ecosystems. Most notably, the
world’s largest asset manager, BlackRock, has introduced a front-end system
following its 2015 acquisition of robo-advisory firm Future Advisor,118 and
114. Whyte, supra note 66.
115. Tencent currently is discussing cooperation with BlackRock in the Chinese asset
management market. See Annie Mass, BlackRock in Talks With Tencent to Explore China
Expansion, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 2, 2019, 10:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/article
s/2019-10-02/blackrock-in-talks-with-tencent-to-explore-expansion-in-china [https://perma.
cc/Z5QW-CEWM].
116. See FIN. STABILITYBD., supra note 97, at 5–11; Frost, et al., supra note 97, at 7–10.
117. PING AN, https://www.pingan.com/us-en.shtml [https://perma.cc/KNR7-Z2VF] (last
visited Oct. 9, 2020).
118. See Samantha Sharf, BlackRock To Buy FutureAdvisor, Signaling Robo-.Advice Is
Here To Stay, FORBES (Aug. 26, 2015, 04:02 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/samanthas
harf/2015/08/26/blackrock-to-buy-futureadvisor-signaling-robo-advice-is-here-to-
stay/#7df91bc63023 [https://perma.cc/KC83-4GTY] (discussing BlackRock’s acquisition of
RoboAdvisor).
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American BigTechs are pursuing similar ecosystem models: Apple is
seeking to build a financial ecosystem with Apple Pay as a key access point
for retail consumers; expansion into other financial services has started with
the Apple Card announced in August 2019.119 Facebook’s intended launch
of Libra also forms the basis of a similar strategy, while Amazon appears to
be focusing on building a financial services marketplace, similar to Ant’s
current direction.120
E. Neo-Investment Platforms
The examples we have provided are the most obvious and enormous in
terms of scale and numbers but are by no means the only ones currently in
operation. Investment platforms similar to those of Fidelity, Schwab,
Vanguard, and J.P. Morgan Chase, created by financial entrepreneurs, have
emerged recently under the label of “robo-adviser.”121 Some robo-advisers,
including Robinhood, 122 have collected several million clients, primarily
attracted by low or even zero asset management fees.123 We observe a
similar tendency of Coinbase, a cryptobroker that claims to have over thirty
million clients.124 These firms are often seeking to build large digital finance
platforms. They are, however, at a huge disadvantage of scale in terms of
assets under management compared with incumbents like BlackRock,
Fidelity, Schwab, Vanguard, Goldman Sachs, and J.P. Morgan Chase.
119. See Ben Gilbert, The Apple Card is a Brilliant Move by Apple to Keep People
Shackled to The iPhone, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 12, 2019, 4:19 PM), https://www.businessinside
r.com/apple-card-only-works-with-iphone-2019-8?r=DE&IR=T [https://perma.cc/KU8U-NJ
HV] (exploring the impact of the launch of the Apple Card).
120. See Dirk Zetzsche, Ross Buckley & Douglas Arner, supra note 12 (in relation to
Libra); Ron Shevlin, Amazon and Goldman Sachs: A Small Business Lending Wake-Up Call
for Banks, FORBES (June 15, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ronshevlin/2020
/06/15/amazon-and-goldman-sachs-a-small-business-lending-wake-up-call-for-banks/#754
664b17891 [https://perma.cc/H6SR-Z2JR] (in relation to Amazon).
121. Tom Baker & Benedict G. C. Dellaert, supra note 21; Megan Ji, supra note 21.
122. See Tyler Clifford, Reaching 10 million users is a ‘testament’ to our mission to
democratize investing, Robinhood co-CEO says, CNBC (Dec. 4, 2019 6:54 PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/04/robinhood-co-ceo-10-million-users-are-a-testament-to-o
ur-mission.html [https://perma.cc/7Z3S-BB5B] (stating that Robin Hood has more than 10
million client accounts).
123. See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, Free Funds: Retirement Savings as Public
Infrastructure, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE REGULATION OF MUTUAL FUNDS 267
(WilliamA. Birdthistle & JohnMorley eds., 2018); WilliamA. Birdthistle &Daniel J. Hemel,
Next Stop for Mutual-Fund Fees: Zero, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 2018, 1:42 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/next-stop-for-mutual-fund-fees-zero-1528652532 [https://per
ma.cc/X9QZ-KYJR].
124. COINBASE, https://www.coinbase.com [https://perma.cc/B4HY-Z9R7] (last visited
Oct. 9, 2020).
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Consequently, many of these FinTech startups are being acquired by, or
cooperating with, incumbents looking to build proprietary systems, by
combining the FinTech’s technology with the scale of customers, assets, and
brand of the established incumbent to compete with the other major players.
Robinhood, for instance, cooperates with Citadel Securities’ back-end
platform, now underlying over 40% of U.S. retail equities trading volume
and 15% of trading volume.125
As we discuss in more detail in Part III, scale is central to network and
data effects, so the trend is already very much toward concentration. The
critical question will be how far this process can go.
II. DIGITAL FINANCE, ASSETMANAGEMENT& THE PLATFORM
ECONOMY
In this Part, we argue that digital finance platforms share technical and
economic characteristics sometimes associated with other technological
“platform industries.” To display their unique attributes, we show how they
function in the world of asset management, which typically rests upon a
foundation of investment funds. We argue that technology has enabled the
evolution of scale and concentration in the asset management industry, most
recently and most visibly in the rise of passive investment funds. As with
other platforms, digital finance platforms benefit from ever-greater
concentrations of customers and counterparties, even if that development is
not optimal for customers and society. We then advance a three-stage
argument for the proposition that a small number of digital finance platforms
are likely to become dominant, not only in asset management but across the
financial system more widely. Such oligopolistic tendencies will trigger
important implications for the financial system, the economy, and our
societies more generally, and require reforms to our regulatory system.
A. The Traditional Theory: Investment Funds as Networks of
Contracts
Investment funds are the primary way in which most investors connect
to the financial system. As a result of technology combined with economies
of scale and network effects, the functions provided by investment funds are
increasingly dominated by digital finance platforms. To the extent these
125. Richard Henderson, Zero-Fee Trading Helps Citadel Securities Cash in on Retail
Boom, FIN. TIMES (June 21, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/4a439398-88ab-442a-9927-
e743a3ff609b [https://perma.cc/H92G-TBNU].
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platforms are vulnerable, nothing less than the trillions of dollars under
management are at risk.
For all the popularity and ubiquity of these funds, they remain a curious
species, and for a good reason: investment funds are, structurally and
operationally, not like stocks and bonds, ordinary businesses, or bank
accounts with which consumers are more familiar. To understand funds, we
must understand the cast of specialist economic actors who, closely
cooperating, form a complex network of contracts that we together call “a
fund” and which underlie traditional business models and regulatory
approaches to the industry.126 In so doing, we highlight how technology has
transformed these models and assumptions resulting in ever-increasing
concentration.
1. Investment Companies, Investment Advisers, and Custodians
Investment companies, investment advisers and custodians form the
core of a fund structure. If one invests money to buy shares of equity
(“stock”) in Ford or Exxon, one expects those companies to use the money
to build more cars or to drill for more oil. As such, shareholders will benefit
if the company’s performance – or, perhaps more accurately, its perceived
performance – improves. Mutual funds do not provide goods or services to
customers in this way but, rather, as investment companies, they provide their
users with a means of investing in other securities.
In mutual funds, the investment adviser is the central actor charged with
investment decisions on behalf of the fund. But they do more: investment
advisers run mutual funds. They manage and direct almost every facet of the
business. The SEC has noted that “the term ‘investment adviser’ is to some
extent a misnomer” because an adviser is “no mere consultant” but “almost
always controls the fund.”127 In return, these advisers owe fiduciary duties
to their own shareholders and to the funds they manage.
The term investment adviser usually refers not to an individual human
being but to a professional investment organization with many employees.
Many investment advisers are household names, such as Fidelity
Management and Research, which manages the Fidelity funds; the Vanguard
Group, which manages the Vanguard funds; Pacific InvestmentManagement
Company, which manages the PIMCO funds; and Franklin Advisers, which
manages the Franklin Templeton funds; as well as T. Rowe Price Associates,
126. See generally RESEARCHHANDBOOK ON THE REGULATION OFMUTUAL FUNDS, supra
note 123; see John Morley, The Separation of Funds and Managers: A Theory of Investment
Fund Structure and Regulation, 123 YALEL. J. 1118, 1243–67 (2014) (discussing investment
funds).
127. In re Steadman Sec. Corp., 46 S.E.C. 896, 920 n.81 (1977).
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BlackRock Advisors, J.P. Morgan Asset Management; and many others.
So, in whom or what do fund investors invest? Not the investment
adviser, as one might expect, given the names of funds that seem to indicate
the contrary.128 Instead, mutual fund investors are shareholders in the new,
separate investment company that the investment adviser creates. Adviser
and fund are linked through the investment advisory agreement, which is a
contract pursuant to which the adviser operates the fund in exchange for a
percentage of the assets of the fund. Investors in a fund are not generally
shareholders of the investment adviser; rather, they are related to the adviser
only through a contractual arrangement. The shares investors hold are a
separate pool of assets legally owned by the investment company, yet
managed by the investment adviser. The sums fund shareholders contribute
go into a combined pool of money that the adviser then uses to buy and sell
other investments, such as shares, bonds, and real estate: these investments
are called portfolio securities.
So, fund shareholders own shares of the mutual fund (such as the
Vanguard Total Stock Market Index Fund), while the mutual fund owns the
portfolio securities (such as Ford or IBM). And each fund shareholder
invests in the hope that a fund’s portfolio securities will increase in value in
order to raise the corresponding value of her fund shares, after fees.129
Mutual funds are legally obliged to retain the services of a custodian.130
This custodian is usually a large financial institution charged with taking
legal custody of a fund’s assets, in an effort to hold and safeguard these assets
on behalf of the fund and its investors during the lifetime of the fund.131
Typically, this role is filled by a major commercial bank, not necessarily
because banks are impregnable but because banks are intensely regulated by
federal banking laws.132 As the legal holder of a fund’s cash and portfolio
investments, a custodian must segregate the fund’s assets from the adviser’s
128. The funds managed by investment advisers almost always come with the advisers’
names on them. In turn, one might reasonably believe that handing over $1,000 to Fidelity
constitutes, if not a bank-like promise, then some sort of investment in Fidelity itself; after
all, Fidelity is the name on the investment. Funds managed by Fidelity include hundreds of
other funds with the name Fidelity. Funds managed by Janus include the Janus Fund, the
Janus Enterprise Fund, the Janus Venture Fund, and approximately thirty other funds with the
name Janus in their titles.
129. Note: the custodian, considered in this Part, holds the portfolio securities on behalf
of the investor/fund.
130. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(f).
131. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY ADM’R OF NAT’L BANKS, CUSTODY SERVICES 1
(2002), https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/comptrollers-handboo
k/files/custody-services/pub-ch-custody-services.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VAY-KUY8].
132. THECLEARINGHOUSE, THECUSTODY SERVICES OFBANKS 10 (2016), https://www.da
vispolk.com/files/20160728_tch_white_paper_the_custody_services_of_banks.pdf [https://p
erma.cc/S476-NJQY].
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assets. In order for any transactions to occur in the fund’s portfolio, the
custodian must receive lawful instructions from a fund’s investment adviser.
This choreography, in which an adviser must transmit orders to the
custodian instructing the custodian to release certain fund assets for the
acquisition of particular securities for the fund’s portfolio, is intended to
thwart fraud or theft in a fund. A custodian also stands as a heavily regulated,
and usually financially stable, third party between the adviser and the fund,
ensuring that in a legal proceeding, the custodian’s large balance sheet may
well be more attractive as a defendant than the investment adviser’s smaller
one. Custodians may be the likeliest targets to sue if assets are lost or stolen.
These separate roles evolved as specialist economic roles, but which
also provided for added security and confidence for investors. Each of these
roles is a licensed activity, subject to regulation by – in most cases – the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and/or Commodities and
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). The combination of separate
functions, isolation of risks, and regulations are intended to help reduce cases
in which an investment adviser simply pockets investors’ money and flees
with it to an undisclosed island in the Caribbean. Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi
schemes were operated in lightly regulated or, indeed, unregulated private
investment funds that did not require custodians. 133 We cannot know
whether Madoff’s perverse ambitions would have foiled even a diligent
custodian, but the presence of any custodian might have made his
machinations more difficult to perpetrate or more easily traceable. Indeed,
of the problems from which mutual funds suffer, rarely have they had
anything to do with corrupt custodians.
2. Distributor, Administrator, and Transfer Agents
A number of other service providers perform important functions for
the contract network that is a fund. The distributor assists in taking a fund
public by distributing the shares of the fund. Parties to whom the distributor
distributes those shares are investors who wish to become shareholders in
the mutual fund; i.e., the distributor persuades investors to place their money
in the fund. An investment adviser often chooses to outsource some of the
back-office tasks to an administrator; this entity will then be responsible for
preparing and filing materials with regulators such as the SEC, with taxing
authorities such as the Internal Revenue Service, and with any other
governmental agencies. A transfer agent must manage the quotidian
requirements of administering potentially millions of client accounts for all
133. Madoff: New Victims, Old Scam, THEWEEK (Jan. 22, 2009), https://theweek.com/ar
ticles/509260/madoff-new-victims-old-scam [https://perma.cc/KN7B-EBDQ].
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of the shareholders in a fund, provide regular statements of their holdings
and sporadic shareholder notices, access to websites with disclosures about
the funds, and toll-free telephone numbers for the investing public. The fund
also needs brokers for trading securities for their portfolios, accountants to
conduct periodic audits of all the money flowing in and out of the fund and
the public statements of the fund’s financial condition, and last but not least,
legal counsel to ensure compliance with the complex web of investment fund
regulations, and deal, at certain challenging times, with litigation.
3. Provider Collaboration: Technology and Platform Evolution
Each of the service providers serves a special function and each of these
functions depends on data access, connectivity, and algorithmic support.
The investment adviser needs to select investments, instruct the broker, and
measure and control the risks taken. The quicker this process, the better,
with all of it now performed digitally and often in milliseconds. When a
custodian controls whether the adviser has complied with investment limits,
when an accountant reviews valuations, and a transfer agent manages
investors’ deposits based on the inflows on the fund’s accounts, they do so
digitally and in a real-time exchange with the other providers. This intense
level of collaboration is the unique feature of funds, which makes their
structure particularly receptive to datafication: taking human agents out of
the loop enhances speed and reduces human-related agency costs, in terms
of wages, errors, self-interest, and bias. But this is also why digital finance
platforms raise such significant concerns in the investment fund industry.
B. Asset Management as a Platform Industry
Processes of digitization and datafication – combined with
technological evolution – are transforming the asset management industry
into a platform industry. In common language, platforms are “a place or
opportunity for communicating ideas and information.”134 In the digital
finance context, the term “platform” refers to a systems architecture where
multiple applications are linked to and through one technical infrastructure
so that users can use one major integrating software system in order to run
all applications written for that system.135
134. Platform, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/platfor
m [https://perma.cc/799M-HMTN] (last visited Sept. 30, 2020).
135. See alsoMARCH.MEYER&ALVINP. LEHNERD, THEPOWEROFPRODUCTPLATFORMS
7 (1997) (defining a platform as “a set of common components, modules, or parts from which
a stream of derivative products can be efficiently created and launched”).
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1. Winner-Takes-All in Asset Management?
Functioning as “spider in the web,” a digital finance platform gathers
data concerning users and their activities, and in turn enjoys the best
information for further developing platform applications and services to
users, resulting in a gradual expansion of the platform in scale and scope. In
turn, the overhead costs of the services provided experience gradual decline,
compared to the socio-economic value provided. We observe “somemixture
of both technology-enabled efficiency enhancement, and technology-
enabled organizational arbitrage,” enabled by the control the platform
providers gain over markets while enhancing their efficiency.136
Risk management systems drawing on deep data pools, for instance, are
expected to gain ever-greater predictive powers; platform providers can
generate additional returns by leveraging this data power into related, yet
new, types of business (in the absence of legal restrictions). If Aladdin’s risk
management data reflect the exposure of the portfolios managed by the
world’s largest asset managers (although in an anonymized way and with
information barriers preventing the transfer of inside information), these data
form the basis of “collective intelligence.” That is, they are the very reason
that other clients seek to license Aladdin’s services.137
If the growth of digital finance platforms is becoming a winner-takes-
all race in asset management, resulting in technology-induced centralization
in the hands of the platform provider,138 defying FinTech’s tendency toward
disintermediation and decentralization,139 this is a very significant concern.
136. See Haberly et al., supra note 50, at 168 (discussing cost reductions and efficiency
enhancements resulting from disruptive platforms inmarkets not traditionally centered around
information and communications technology).
137. And of course, these data could be used for front running the strategies of these
managers, hence rules addressing data confidentiality, use, and protection are key.
138. See More Knock-On than Network, THEECONOMIST, June 30, 2018, at S5 (explaining
concentration of power in big tech).
139. See Max Kanaskar, The Five D’s of Fintech: Disintermediation, MAX KANASKAR’S
BLOG (Jan. 9, 2018), https://maxkanaskar.wordpress.com/2018/01/09/the-five-ds-of-fintech-
disintermediation/ [https://perma.cc/T7KV-YM9C] (discussing disintermediation in
FinTech). Certainly, cloud computing and open-source software have both served to lower
the barriers to entry that FinTechs face. As against this, however, are the incredible economies
of scope and scale that digital finance platforms offer. And not to forget the challenges
decentralization provides for effective regulation and supervision. See Dirk A. Zetzsche,
Douglas W. Arner & Ross P. Buckley, Decentralized Finance, 6 J. FIN. REGUL. 172 (2020)
(analyzing how decentralization could undermine the effectiveness of traditional financial
regulation and enforcement).
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2. The Digital Platform Economy
The debate over whether information markets are unique, and thus
whether their legal ordering must also be unique, dates back to the debate
between Judge Frank H. Easterbrook and Professor Lawrence Lessig over
“The Law of the Horse.”140 Contemporary scholarship, it seems, sides with
Professor Lessig. Features of technology platforms are an increasingly
major focus of interest of contemporary legal scholarship with the evolution
of BigTech platform firms such as Amazon, Microsoft, Google and
Facebook. 141 In considering the evolution of platforms, scholars first
examined why platform firms give away access to core technologies142 and
concluded that “open source” enables rapid innovation, while retaining some
profits by restricting access to useful innovators.
As has become obvious in the COVID-19 pandemic, e-commerce
platforms provide unique benefits – centralized shopping and decentralized
access through delivery of goods. They also require e-payments, thus
bridging to digital finance. At the same time, the platform economy is seen
as catalyst for social issues that touch all aspects of society, on topics ranging
140. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 207, 207 (1996) (arguing that discussing the law of computer systems results in
“multidisciplinary dilettantism,” since “[b]eliefs lawyers hold about computers, and
predictions they make about new technology, are highly likely to be false” and arguing that
there is no more a “law of cyberspace” than there is a “law of the horse”), with Lawrence
Lessig, Commentary, The Law of The Horse: What CyberlawMight Teach, 113 HARVL.REV.
501, 502 (1999) (responding and arguing that thinking about how law and cyberspace connect
would assist in illuminating the entire law, as Judge Easterbrook had demanded).
141. The platform economy is sometimes also called the gig economy or sharing economy.
Shu-Yi Oei, The Trouble with Gig Talk: Choice of Narrative and the Worker Classification
Fights, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 107 (2018); see also Vassilis Hatzopoulos & Sofia
Roma, Caring for Sharing? The Collaborative Economy under EU Law, 54 COMMONMKTL.
REV. 81 (2017) (referring to the platform economy euphemistically as the collaborative
economy). However, using different terms interchangeably can have practical consequences.
See Shu-Yi Oei, The Trouble with Gig Talk: Choice of Narrative and the Worker
Classification Fights, 81 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 118 (2018) (arguing that euphemistic
terms such as sharing economy influence the outcome of legal classification issues); Abbey
Stemler, The Myth of the Sharing Economy and its Implications for Regulating Innovation,
67 EMORY L.J. 197, 197 (2017) (arguing that the term supports the claim that platforms are
unique and should be subject to new and different regulation or no regulation at all). We
prefer the term platform economy due to its technical, non-political character, and its wide-
spread acceptance in business-focused academic circles. See DAVIS S. EVANS&RICHARD L.
SCHMALENSEE, MATCHMAKERS: THENEW ECONOMICS OFMULTISIDED PLATFORMS (2016).
142. Jonathan M. Barnett, The Host’s Dilemma: Strategic Forfeiture in Platform Markets
for Informational Goods, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1874 (2011).
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across privacy,143 product liability,144 public housing,145 discrimination,146
labor and employment law,147 and tax law.148 Platforms are also at the heart
of the discussions on “fake news” and electoral manipulation149 as well as
manipulation of consumer prices,150 search results151 and scoring power.152
143. SeeMary Madden et al., Privacy, Poverty, and Big Data: A Matrix of Vulnerabilities
for the Poor, 95 WASH. L. REV. 53 (2017) (examining relationships between data, privacy,
and economic inequality); Anita L. Allen, Commentary, Protecting One’s Own Privacy in a
Big Data Economy, 130 HARV. L. REV. F. 71 (2016) (discussing moral and ethical obligations
to protect one’s own privacy and challenges posed by Big Data).
144. See David Berke, Products Liability in the Sharing Economy, 33 YALE J. ON REG.
603 (2016) (analyzing products liability issues in the sharing economy).
145. See Nestor M. Davidson & John Infranca, The Sharing Economy as an Urban
Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 215 (2016) (describing relationship between urban
conditions and the sharing economy).
146. See Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2122 (2019) (discussing
inequality and racial disparity in predictions); Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public
Accommodations: Race Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271 (2017)
(discussing race discrimination); Arianne Renan Barzilay & Anat Ben-David, Platform
Inequality: Gender in the Gig-Economy, 47 SETON HALL L. REV. 393 (2017) (discussing
gender discrimination in the sharing economy).
147. See Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to
Basics, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 479 (2016) (examining employment status of platform
economy workers); Matthew T. Bodie, Lessons from the Dramatists Guild for the Platform
Economy, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 17 (2017) (exploring worker categorization issues in the
platform economy).
148. From a scholarly perspective see Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Taxing the Gig
Economy, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1415, 1428, 1454 (2018) (discussing current taxation of online
workers as “business owners” and proposing a taxation model closer to that of wage earners,
based on a “standard business deduction” irrespective of the legal form of work); Shu-Yi Oei
& Diane Ring, Can Sharing be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989, 1028–29 (2016) (analyzing
online firms’ first mover advantage and rent seeking through regulatory arbitrage, gaps and
ambiguities in the law); Shu-Yi Oei & Diane Ring, The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers: Evidence
from Internet Discussion Forums, 8 COLUM. J. TAX L. 56, 60 (2017) (analyzing a series of
postings by rideshare drivers on internet discussion forums and arguing that forum
participants had difficulties understanding fundamental business taxation concepts, such as
expenses and deductions).
149. See, e.g., Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes
Governing Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018); Jack M. Balkin, Free Speech in
an Algorithmic Society: Big Data, Private Governance, and New School Speech Regulation,
51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1149 (2018); Nabiha Syed, Real Talk About Fake News: Towards a
Better Theory for Platform Governance, 127 YALE L.J.F. 337 (2017).
150. Oren Bar-Gill,Algorithmic Price DiscriminationWhenDemand is a Function of Both
Preferences and (Mis)Perceptions, 86 U. Chi. L. Rev. 217 (2019).
151. FRANK PASQUALE, THEBLACKBOX SOCIETY 59–100 (2015).
152. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014); Ryan
Calo, Response, Consumer Subject Review Boards: A Thought Experiment, 66 STAN. L. REV.
ONL. 97 (2013); Danielle K. Citron & Frank A. Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process
for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014). See on remedies Andrew D. Selbst,
Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L.REV. 109 (2018); Frank A. Pasquale &Oren
Bracha, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and Accountability in the Law of
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These concentrations thus bring benefits but also raise many concerns,
particularly in the context of dominant platforms.
C. Pro-Concentration Effects
Notwithstanding scholarly interest in the subject, “[a]lthough platforms
form the backbone of the internet economy, the way that platform economics
implicates existing laws is relatively undertheorized,”153 though this has been
changing rapidly in the past two to three years, outside of finance. In the
context of finance and asset management, in particular, digital finance
platforms have not been sufficiently examined from a legal perspective.154
Three factors together lead to a friction in the market that prevents
private ordering from leading to socially optimal outcomes, in the sense that
market forces ensure competition among digital asset management
providers: traditional scale economies, data-driven economics of scale, and
network effects.155
1. Conventional Scale Economies
Economies of scale refer to the reduction of per-unit production costs
as a consequence of producing units in larger quantities.156 Digital finance
platforms exhibit conventional economies of scale created by the primarily
fixed costs of providing the service to an unlimited number of users. They
are based on applications and interfaces operating on high-frequency servers.
Once the interfaces have been defined, the applications coded, and the
servers set up, connecting all additional clients comes at very low marginal
costs. Where additional users mean additional marginal costs for energy and
data warehousing, these additional costs per user are offset by the additional
data these users create, allowing the platform provider to choose, more or
less freely, which services the platform charges clients for, and which
Search, 93 CORN. L. REV. 1149 (2008).
153. Lina M. Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALEL.J. 710, 789 (2017); see also
David Singh Grewal, Before Peer Production: Infrastructure Gaps and the Architecture of
Openness in Synthetic Biology, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 143, 196 (2017) (arguing that
platforms are “relatively under-theorized”).
154. The platform perspective of digital finance has been analyzed from a geographical
perspective, see Haberly, et al., supra note 50, at 169.
155. Haberly, et al., supra note 50, at 169.
156. These scale economies are particularly present in software markets where the costs
of the original application (“first copy”) are enormous, while the costs of the second through
N copies are minimal and become close to zero. While licensing models and modern anti-
piracy devices restrict software users from making use of these characteristics, the software
producer and licensor are not bound by these restrictions and is free, in principle, if pressed
by its competitor to reduce the price.
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services are provided to them apparently for free.
This practice is particularly true in the asset management industry –
particularly the investment fund industry and even more so in the context of
passive investment – where large entities can invest in software
programming and development themselves, while small asset managers are
usually price takers (unless they have in-house software programing
expertise) who must pay (in proportion to their business size) high software
licensing and data warehousing fees. The more important the technology is
for the industry, and the more software tools are required, the higher these
costs are in proportion to other expenses, and the greater the incentive to sign
up to an existing platform that relieves the small managers of this burden.
Given that technology is swiftly rising in importance, smaller asset
managers have no choice but to contract with a platform or to accept the fate
of being inhibited in their growth by IT limitations and costs. This forms the
economic rationale of the 210 asset managers using BlackRock’s Aladdin.
In turn, Aladdin not only provides savings for BlackRock’s own funds, but
also generates licensing fees from competing asset managers.
2. Data-driven Economies of Scale
The second type of scale economies result from the data collected and
used for the application. In simple terms: “[m]ore information lets firms
develop better services, which attracts more users, which in turn generate
more data.”157 Where risk management depends on data, we would expect
better predictions if the digital finance platform can collect more and better
structured data. To ensure this sequence, Aladdin’s AI laboratory in
California exists to prepare Aladdin for the AI future, by creating new, AI-
based services.158
3. Network Effects
Digital platforms also exhibit network effects. Network effects occur
where an additional user of a service adds value to that product for other
users. So, the more users, the greater the benefit.159 For instance, a telephone
157. A New School in Chicago, THE ECONOMIST, June 28, 2018, https://www.economist.c
om/special-report/2018/06/28/how-regulators-can-prevent-excessive-concentration-online [h
ttps://perma.cc/SQL3-3F9D].
158. History, BLACKROCK, https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/about-us/blackrock-his
tory [https://perma.cc/7BQV-8HCJ] (last visited Oct. 19, 2020).
159. See AMRIT TIWANA, PLATFORM ECOSYSTEMS: ALIGNING ARCHITECTURE,
GOVERNANCE, AND STRATEGY 33–48 (2014) (analyzing the benefits to users of greater total
users).
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is of little use unless it can be used to call other people. The more people
who can be called, the more valuable the phone. Applied to the fund context,
the more a software program can communicate with other participants in
fund administration, the more valuable the virtual network created by the
platform becomes. With funds, software typically focuses upon fund
administration, asset management, or depositary functions and
communicates with depositaries, stock exchanges, and alternative markets.
Network effects are particularly prominent in the asset management
context. First, the value of the software based “network” grows in proportion
to the numbers of copies installed in fund firms; the look and feel of software
becomes embedded in human processes. Users know where to click, which
shortcuts to use, and how to upload data or link to the internet. The more
software is used among fund administrators and asset managers, the more
those users expect this software and their features in their work environment.
Second, any additional user adds data to the existing pool. Where risk
management can draw on more data from more firms, the predictive power
of the platform’s algorithms improves. Take again the example of
BlackRock’s Aladdin: firm-specific data pools suffer from data shortages in
relation to low frequency risk events. Among these, internal fraud, business
disruption, and IT failures are potentially of “high severity”; that is, these
operational risks could threaten the existence of a financial institution.160
Aladdin’s predictive power is not impaired by such data shortages when it
can use the data of all its asset manager clients rather than just that those
generated by BlackRock itself. In this case, all network participants benefit
from pooling risk data.
BlackRock is very clear in stressing these network effects of Aladdin:
More than just technology, Aladdin powers your firm’s Collective
Intelligence by providing tools to help your organization
communicate effectively, address problems more quickly, and
make decisions at every step of the investment process. And
Aladdin’s Collective Intelligence gets better with every new user,
and every new asset that joins the platform.161
It is thus clear that the asset management industry increasingly shows
160. See BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION (“BCBS”), SOUND PRACTICES FOR
THEMANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISION OFOPERATIONALRISK, at 18 (2001) (stating that “banks
may not have much internal data for certain low frequency operational risk loss types”);
BCBS, OPERATIONAL RISK – SUPERVISORY GUIDELINES FOR THE ADVANCED MEASUREMENT
APPROACHES 49–50 (June 2011) (stating that “many banks have limited high severity internal
loss events to inform the tail of the distribution(s) for their capital charge modelling”).
161. Aladdin - Powering Collective Intelligence, BLACKROCK, https://www.BlackRock.c
om/aladdin/benefits/organizations [https://perma.cc/RPH8-3QVY] (last visited Oct. 14,
2020).
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the concentration characteristics of other platform industries, with trends in
consolidation and emergence of a small number of major players already
clearly taking place.
III. THENEED FORREGULATINGDIGITAL FINANCE PLATFORMS
While network effects, conventional economics of scale, and data-
driven scale economies explain the dramatic rise and scope of digital
platforms, their success raises questions about how they ensure that investor
protection, market efficiency, national security, and systemic financial
stability can be maintained under conditions of ever-increasing market
concentration. We outline, first, their positive effects, then argue that
traditional regulatory approaches to asset management do not address the
changing reality of the industry, before considering a variety of regulatory
approaches available to address the increasing range of risks raised by their
evolution.
A. Optimizing Tech-Based Fund Services
From the perspective of end-user clients, digital finance platforms can
reduce their costs by bundling all platform clients’ purchasing power, by
improving performance through tech-driven customization, by reducing
inefficiencies stemming from manual work and data shortages, and by
reducing search and transaction costs. At the same time, such platforms can
enable entirely new markets and rapidly enhance innovation, by offering
innovations developed by one participant to all other platform users.162 All
of these benefits come with little operational effort on the clients’ part, as the
platform acts as meta-integrating technology, or “super applications.”
Digital finance platforms “could be the steady hand that the markets of the
future will need. A powerful stabilizing technology such as Aladdin could
yet be the source of ‘GreatModeration’ that neoliberalism tried to deliver.”163
Fields that might embrace this kind of innovation include, for instance,
robo-advice for specialist strategies, automated fund formation, and
valuation of illiquid assets. In particular, smaller specialist firms that focus
on non-core parts of the investment value chain could capitalize on scale
162. For studies on the platform economy dating back to the early 2000s, see Jean-Charles
Rochet & Jean Tirole, Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets, 1 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N
990 (2003); for contemporary works seeDAVIS S. EVANS&RICHARDL. SCHMALENSEE, supra
note 141; ANNABELLE GAWER, PLATFORMS, MARKETS AND INNOVATION (2009); AMRIT
TIWANA, PLATFORM ECOSYSTEMS: ALIGNING ARCHITECTURE, GOVERNANCE, AND STRATEGY
61–69 (2014).
163. Dunn, supra note 52, at 10.
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economies created through access to larger numbers of clients via the
platform, if their services can be efficiently integrated into the client’s
existing business model. Back-end platforms also enable the separation of
front and back end businesses, as in the case of Robinhood and Citadel,
whose ecosystem platforms support the widest possible access to customers
and products.
Although robo-advice has been discussed most prominently from the
retail perspective as a disruptor of traditional asset management, for instance,
financial platforms support the optimization of wholesale and institutional
asset management strategies. This development is not a surprise: already
today, most investment decisions with regard to liquid financial assets rely
on technological support. Algorithms select potential assets according to a
number of predetermined preference values, such as valuation in correlation
to peers, liquidity on exchanges, profit per share, etc.164 The same level of
tech support exists in risk management systems where warnings inform the
risk manager that a risk budget has been depleted and risk mitigation,
through hedging or closing of positions, is necessary. Without tech support,
human decision makers are slower and more error-prone due to human
foibles, and – in markets where algorithmic trading prevails – doomed to lose
out to their tech-powered competitors.165 The acquisition of robo-advisors
by asset management giants Vanguard, BlackRock, Charles Schwab, and
Fidelity can be understood in this light, as can the dominance in U.S. trading
of a small number of tech focused quantitative firms, in particular, Citadel.
The same trend towards digitalization is noteworthy for transfer agents.
For instance, Delaware has taken steps to ensure that shareholder
identification can take place in real time using blockchain technology, via
which all investor data are spread over a network.166 If broker-dealers and
banks in which investors hold their deposit accounts submit data of those
buying and selling fund units immediately via blockchain to the fund
manager, the register of fund investors will be more complete and more up-
to-date. The register function will be replaced by a data feed connecting it
to the blockchain, unless the law allows for the blockchain to be the register
itself.167
164. Regulators distinguish between fully automated robo-adviser platforms and human
assisted robo-advisory platforms. INT’LORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 76, at 25–26.
165. JON BECKETT, NEW FUND ORDER – A DIGITAL DEATH FOR FUND SELECTION?, 32 et
seq. (2016).
166. Federico Panisi, Ross P. Buckley & Douglas Arner, Blockchain and Public
Companies: A Revolution in Share Ownership Transparency, Proxy Voting and Corporate
Governance?, 2 STAN. J. BLOCKCHAIN L. & POL’Y 189, 206 (2019).
167. See generally George S. Geis, Traceable Shares and Corporate Law, 113 NW. U. L.
REV. 227 (2018) (analyzing the profound impact blockchain technology will have on
corporate law).
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B. The Traditional Asset Management Regulatory Paradigm
The traditional regulatory approach to asset management is based on a
combination of disclosure (to support appropriate investor choice), external
review by a range of gatekeepers (accountants, auditors, lawyers, exchanges,
etc.), regulatory licensing and supervision (to address the fitness of market
participants), private and public enforcement of both informational and
conduct rules, structural requirements (in particular asset segregation),
private ordering, and self-regulation. This approach – while sufficient to
support the evolution of the world’s deepest capital markets and largest asset
management industry – evolved in the context of a traditional understanding
of the asset management industry and does not fully address the issues
resulting from concentration.
As one example, regulators around the world have worked to identify
nonbank systemically important financial institutions (“SIFIs”).168 Yet, the
federal watchdog for systemic risk, the Financial Stability Oversight Council
(“FSOC”), has not determined that any of the world’s largest asset managers
is a non-bank SIFI (and, at this time, no other institution is designated as a
non-bank SIFI). In addition, none of the U.S. digital finance platforms has
been determined to be a systemically important Financial Market Utility, and
hence subject to the heightened prudential, risk management and supervisory
provisions of Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act for important market
infrastructure. 169 Those determinations, however, were based on a
traditional analysis looking at the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration,
and interconnectedness of the institution; i.e., its balance sheet size, assets
held, and exposures to counterparties.170 The point we stress in this Article,
however, is that platforms function as a liquidity bundler, data warehouse,
and financial infrastructure.
168. See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial
Companies, 84 Fed. Reg. 9028 (proposed March 13, 2019) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.
1310) (authorizing certain designated nonbank financial companies to be overseen by the
Federal Reserve).
169. Reflecting its size, scope, and scale, Ant was reportedly designated a systemically
important financial institution (“SIFI”) by the PBoC in late 2018. Gabriel Wildau, China to
Designate More Financial Groups as “Too Big To Fail,” FIN. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2018), https:
//www.ft.com/content/22279e54-f22d-11e8-ae55-df4bf40f9d0d [https://perma.cc/CYL8-HS
96]. Concerns about its potential to impact financial stability are central to increasing Chinese
regulatory attention to Ant and other digital financial platforms, necessitating the suspension
of Ant’s planned listing in November 2020. Beijing Says It Halted $37bn Ant IPO to Protect
Market Stability, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/eb0746f1-51fe-438
d-886b-18bb7cc9456f [https://perma.cc/C7QH-LTTJ].
170. Designations, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues
/financial-markets-financial-institutions-and-fiscal-service/fsoc/designations [https://perma.c
c/6HQ3-HTAW] (last visited Oct. 28, 2020).
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The emerging digital finance platforms in the asset management
industry thus escape regulation appropriate to their nature. Such a result is
in line with scholarship analyzing platform environments, which finds
traditional regulation fails because of circumvention and regulatory
arbitrage.171 The main reason for financial regulation’s failure is that three
disparate sources contribute to the role of the platform as “spider in the web”:
applications, data and servers. These three together create the network
effects, yet neither data collection, software (“app”) development, nor server
processing qualifies as a licensed activity, so bundling the three functions
likewise does not trigger the need for any special financial regulatory license.
Though some believe turning entity-focused regulation into activity-
based regulation would address these issues, that would not be so for digital
finance platforms. In a typical digital finance platform, institutional clients
perform the regulated activity, while the platform primarily provides the IT
backbone. Even if operating a digital finance platform were defined as a
regulated activity (as is the case with the operation of payment or securities
settlement systems), regulating one platform provider based on its regulated
activities is rarely sufficient to reflect the exposures and dependency of all
users. This would be further complicated for cross-border platforms, with a
fully developed financial ecosystem needing multiple licenses from multiple
regulators across many jurisdictions. With such a patchwork of multiple
licenses, none of the regulators is likely to have full oversight of all the
financial activities.
C. Regulating Digital Finance Platforms
The arguments in favor of regulating digital finance platforms in asset
management as well as in other financial sectors flow from four main
established rationales of financial law: market efficiency, financial stability,
171. See Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, 87 MINN. L. REV. 101 (2016) (analyzing
the effectiveness of regulation in a platform environment, arguing that the platform economy
defies conventional regulatory theory, and holding that legal disruption by the platform
economy should be viewed as a feature rather than a bug of regulatory limits); Julie E. Cohen,
Law for the Platform Economy, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 133, 133 (2017) (arguing that the
platform is the core organizational form of the informational economy, replacing and
rematerializing existing traditional markets, and that “legal institutions, including both
entitlements and regulatory institutions, have systematically facilitated the platform
economy’s emergence,” and analyzing challenges that platform-based information
intermediation has posed for regulatory institutions); Jordan Barry & Elizabeth Pollman,
Regulatory Entrepreneurship, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 383, 385 (2017) (dubbing the platform
businesses as “regulatory entrepreneurs” that seek to initiate tailor-made regulation in their
favor); Paul Ohm & Blake E. Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has Software, 84
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672 (2016) (analyzing the challenges regulators and coders face given
the proliferation of software and code).
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national security, and client and investor protection.
1. Market Efficiency
Within the market efficiency paradigm, the concentration of many
services in the hands of one platform, and the dependency of the clients on
it, provide valid reasons for concern. In financial ecosystems, clients will be
served literally from their birth to death by one platform providing not only
financial, but also many other, services ranging from transport to food
supply. At the same time, if the growth factors discussed supra exhibit their
true power, only a very limited number of platforms will survive to provide
these services, perhaps only three to five. The corollary of “winner-takes-
all” is “everyone-else-loses.”
This prediction is not unique to digital finance platforms, but a well-
discussed characteristic of all platform industries. 172 With general use
applications like search engines, social media, and so forth, consumers
twenty years ago had a choice between many different platforms, including
Netscape, Yahoo and others. Today, for mass scale applications, only one
or two dominant platforms are used by the overwhelming majority of users:
Google is the dominant search engine, Facebook the dominant social media
platform, MS Office the dominant office platform, Amazon the dominant e-
commerce platform, and so forth. As a historical matter, all American
information markets have turned into monopolies or oligopolies over time,173
and this increasingly appears to describe the evolution of cloud services
markets.174
In the same way, one or two of the finance platforms will most likely
emerge as winners in a winner-take-all competition. Those will be the ones
that can best capitalize on the three growth factors discussed above:
conventional and data-driven economies of scope, scale, and network effects.
Financial law so far does little to hinder market concentration; quite the
opposite. When the law asks for new reports and processes, some
(particularly larger) firms will technologize and comply, expanding the
platform’s service range. Others, in particular small and mid-size entities
172. See Khan, supra note 153, at 785 (examining the winner-take-all nature of online
platforms).
173. See TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF INFORMATION EMPIRES
280-299 (2010) (arguing that American information industries tend to press towards
monopolies); see also ARIEL EZRACHI & MAURICE E. STUCKE, VIRTUAL COMPETITION: THE
PROMISE AND PERILS OF THE ALGORITHM-DRIVEN ECONOMY (2006) (discussing the promise
and perils of technology-driven competition).
174. See FIN. STABILITY BD., THIRD-PARTY DEPENDENCIES IN CLOUD SERVICES:
CONSIDERATIONS ON FINANCIAL STABILITY IMPLICATIONS (Dec. 2019) (analyzing risks to
financial stability of high concentration in cloud services).
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incapable of meeting reporting demands on their own, will rely on the
platform to comply in return for ceding a part of their profits. This dynamic
will effectively turn the reliant providers into a part of the larger platform
ecosystem, a merger not in name but in function. A larger entity will, part-
by-part, consume opportunities made consumable by their activities. Ever-
fewer entities with larger scale economies will capitalize on more expensive-
to-build and higher value technology. Initial evidence of this trajectory
already exists in how the ten largest asset managers including BlackRock,
Vanguard, and Fidelity have outgrown the remainder of the industry.175 In
the period of 2009 to 2019, the market share of the five largest managers
offering passive funds grew from 27% to 47%.176 This projected trajectory
is likely to occur, in the absence of legal barriers (such as the prohibition of
bundling of certain functions) or disruptive technological innovations that
reduce the platform’s usefulness.
Most scholarship so far has turned to antitrust law in order to address
such concerns. For instance, while government agencies such as the
Department of Justice often treat platform-based products and non-platform
goods alike, antitrust scholarship increasingly treats platforms as unique.177
Specifically, scholars note the attractiveness of network participation
achieved through data collection, and that network effects erect
insurmountable barriers to entry for new competitors.178 Where investors –
due to data and network effects – reward size over profit, predatory pricing
175. See Pooneh Baghai, Onur Erzan & Ju-Hon Kwek, North American Asset
Management in 2018: The New Great Game, MCKINSEY&COMPANY (Nov. 2018), https://w
ww.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Financial%20Services/Our%20Insights/T
he%20new%20Great%20Game%20in%20North%20American%20asset%20management/N
orth-American-asset-management-2018-vf.ashx [https://perma.cc/4LXR-AZJ6] (stating that
“the industry’s largest firms accounted for a disproportionate share of growth, with a set of
‘trillionaires’ generating over 80 percent of all positive organic growth and several making
significant gains in share even outside of passive products”).
176. Anadu et al., supra note 96, at 18.
177. See generally David S. Evans, The Antitrust Economics of Multi-Sided Platform
Markets, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 325 (2003) (providing an overview of the unique antitrust
economic principles of multi-sided platform markets); Khan, supra note 153, at 784 (2017)
(discussing how platform markets may pose unique challenges for antitrust analysis); Frank
Pasquale, Two Narratives of Platform Capitalism, 35 YALE L.&POL’YREV. 309, 311 (2016)
(developing a counter-narrative to the dominant neo-liberal view on the platform economy).
178. SeeAdamCandeub, Behavioral Economics, Internet Search, and Antitrust, 9 I/S 407,
409 (2014) (arguing that switching costs prevent users from selecting new service providers
in the absence of widespread malfunctioning of the system); Nathan Newman, Search,
Antitrust, and the Economics of the Control of User Data, 31 YALE J. REG. 401, 404 (2014)
(arguing in favor of a stronger focus on the anticompetitive effects of a firm’s control of the
users’ personal data); Frank Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and Power, 20 GEO.MASON. L.REV.
1009, 1015–16 (2013) (arguing that it is difficult for consumers to switch to a new social
platform because of the high cost of transferring one’s network of friends).
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becomes highly rational (even as the prevailing doctrine treats it as irrational
and therefore implausible).179 Thus, striving for dominance today, even
where costly, is a worthwhile strategy, since it ensures monopoly rents in the
future. Platforms are further able to “exploit information collected on
companies using its services to undermine them as competitors.”180
In turn, economists have started to model platforms as two-sided
markets, where the client demand side is subject to different assumptions
than the platform provider supply side.181
For our purposes, we need here simply stress that market concentration
provides not only an antitrust but also a financial law challenge: the fewer
asset management providers that compete, the fewer incentives to innovation
that will exist, and the greater the potential systemic risks from size (“too-
big-to-fail”) or interconnection (“too-connected-to-fail”). While platforms
assist in optimizing fund services in the short term, benefits may be reversed
once the provider gains a dominant position. A major concern is that
innovation is likely to be slower than in the absence of a dominant platform.
Consequently, the financial regulatory rationale of securing long-term
market efficiency justifies platform oversight.
2. Systemically Important Digital Finance Platforms (SI-DFP)
A central concern of financial regulation relates to the stability of the
financial system. This stability is threatened if an entity that is important for
the financial system fails, as demonstrated in the 2008 crisis.182
Generally speaking, an entity is systemically important if it is of such
size or level of interconnectedness that its failure or default would put at risk
the wider functioning of the financial system or significant numbers of other
financial institutions. Size-related systemic risk is traditionally covered in
179. See Khan, supra note 153, at 710.
180. See Khan, supra note 153, at 710, 754–87 (2017) （arguing that Amazon uses the
information it gathers from competitors as a service provider to gain an advantage over them）
; K. Sabeel Rahman & Lina Khan, Restoring Competition in the U.S. Economy, in UNTAMED:
HOW TO CHECK CORPORATE, FINANCIAL AND MONOPOLY POWER 18, 18 (Nell Abernathy, et al.,
eds.) (2016) (finding that the harms from dominant platform firms include lower wages for
employees, lower rates of new business creation, lower rates of local ownership, and
concentration of power); MARK R. PATTERSON, ANTITRUST LAW IN THE NEW ECONOMY:
GOOGLE, YELP, LIBOR, AND THE CONTROL OF INFORMATION 1–4 (2017) (arguing in favor of
conceptualizing data as a product, since data, although different from traditional goods, poses
similar problems in antitrust terms, such as monopoly and collusion).
181. See Rochet & Tirole, supra note 162, passim.
182. See Howell Jackson, Thinking Hard About Systemic Risk, in SYSTEMIC RISK IN THE
FINANCIAL SECTOR 2–3 (Arner et al. eds., 2019) (discussing the systemic risks to the financial
system that manifested during the financial crisis).
320 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OFBUSINESS LAW [Vol. 23:1
discussions of too-big-to-fail (“TBTF”183 ) risks. Large banks governed
under special regulations for global systemically important financial
institutions (“G-SIFIs”) provide the most important example. Another
source of systemic risk stems from interconnectivity, referred to as too-
connected-too-fail (“TCTF”). Consider, as examples, a stock exchange or a
central securities depositary (“CSD”). All financial institutions that trade
rely on both a stock exchange and a CSD for trading, clearing, and
settlement. If a stock exchange or a CSD defaults, trading of products may
stop due to loss of pricing and liquidity functions from which all market
participants benefit. This failure would impact a wide range of
counterparties and potentially impact the overall functioning of, or
confidence in, the system.
Digital finance platforms in the asset management industry are not
exposed to financial risk in the same sense as banks, and hence have been
regulated differently. All losses and profits of a bank accumulate on the
bank’s own balance sheet. If a bank client defaults, the bank will write off
the credit, and the principal written off will be much higher than the bank’s
income generated through provision of the credit. By contrast, asset
managers and the related service providers’ services are, for the most part,
off-balance sheet; that is, losses and profit accumulate in separate accounts
held in the clients’ names. Digital finance platforms do, however, generate
a significant degree of operational risk, particularly risks that the system fails
for human or, increasingly, technical reasons.184
These operational risks are increasingly of systemic dimensions, under
both the TBTF and the TCTF paradigms. As to TBTF, the sheer size and
scope of financial ecosystems indicate the potential of platform businesses
to jump from too-small-too-care to TBTF within a short time. Consider,
again, the magnitude of Ant, 185 which required only a few years of
uninhibited growth to become systemically significant; or the assets served
by BlackRock’s Aladdin, which all but dwarf the assets of the largest banks
globally; and the quite astonishing growth rates of both front-end and back-
end platform providers.186
183. See Saule T. Omarova, The “Too Big To Fail” Problem, 103 MINN. L. REV. 2495,
2499–2504 (2019), for a classification of TBTF.
184. See Ross P. Buckley et al., TechRisk, SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 39 (2020)
(incorporating technological and data issues into the operational risk framework of FinTech).
185. Recall Ant’s SIFI designation and the rationale underlying the suspension of its IPO
in November 2020. See supra note 169.
186. As to front-end platforms, IOSCO, the global standard setter for securities regulation
(including asset and fund management), examining the impact of fund distribution platforms
on the asset management industry, found that these platforms have experienced rapid growth
in recent years. See INT’LORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 76, at 22, 25, 68–69 (reporting
the recent rapid growth of retail trading and investment platforms).
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As to TCTF, digital finance platforms provide the core functions of
their clients’ business. If the platform fails, its clients will often be hindered
from communicating with their clients, nor will the clients be able to perform
the services their clients expect. Losses generated by platform malfunctions
will thus spread to their clients’ clients into the overall financial and non-
financial economy. This domino effect will be so because Aladdin connects
people and processes of various asset managers, a fact BlackRock refers to
as “Collective Intelligence.” 187 All those connected may suffer from
Aladdin’s temporary service interruption, experiencing a state of “Collective
Stupidity.” More generally, digital finance platforms– as the spider in the
web – represent the single point of failure for not only one, but many
institutional and retail clients. As the CEO of New York Life Investors, an
Aladdin client managing $238 billion in assets, states, “Aladdin is like
oxygen. Without it we wouldn’t be able to function.”188 Furthermore, the
value managed using Aladdin increases the risk of investor herding behavior
since these amounts may have the ability to set market trends. Aladdin’s
clients, implicitly coordinated through Aladdin’s risk analysis, may find the
same type of assets attractive, or unattractive, at the same time.189 If this is
the case, Aladdin’s risk analysis needs to be accurate, or wide-spread asset
mispricing and misallocation may occur. Regulators need to be aware of
what to do in case Aladdin gets it wrong, producing potentially systemic
mispricing and trading activity.
Both the TBTF and TCTF perspective explain filmmaker Adam Curtis’
description of Aladdin as “a kind of power never seen before . . . more
powerful in some respects than traditional politics.” 190
3. National Security
Within the market integrity paradigm, digital finance platforms may
attract illicit activity. Putting money laundering and terrorist financing
concerns aside,191 more importantly, as an extension of systemic importance,
digital finance platforms may constitute a challenge to national security
simply because they represent a single point of failure. Any foreign or
terrorist power interested could focus on a single platform and are
187. Aladdin® Enterprise Overview, supra note 51.
188. Gara, supra note 61.
189. See Dunn, supra note 52 (explaining how Aladdin uses Monte Carlo simulations to
value every individual security for clients).
190. Dunn, supra note 52.
191. In most cases, AML/CTF concerns relate to client onboarding. The KYC processes
could be performed by the platform itself or its clients. In this regard few additional risks
stem from the fact that a platform stands at the center of many financial service relationships.
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increasingly doing so. Cyber risks in particular raise significant national
security concerns, making resilience a first order focus.
In line with this analysis, FSOC has warned that the “financial system’s
increasing reliance on information technology, particularly across a broader
array of interconnected platforms, increases the risk that a cybersecurity
event could have severe negative consequences for the provision of financial
services” and even “threaten the stability of the broader financial system.”192
4. Client and Investor Protection
Digital finance platforms also create a variety of risks for investors. The
number of investors who directly rely upon the current financial order for
their personal fiscal health has increased dramatically over time as ever more
investors now direct their retirement savings through defined contribution
plans. As many as 46% of households in the United States alone direct their
personal savings into mutual funds.193 Thus, the financial landscape features
increasing numbers of participants with decreasing degrees of financial
sophistication. Accordingly, the number and vulnerability of targets to the
risks of platform failure are high and rising each year.
Where the fund is essentially the product of a network of contracts, the
core issue of fund governance is aligning the multiple intermediaries’ interest
with the investors’ interest. 194 Adding a digital platform in between
investor/clients on one side, and the portfolio assets on the other, creates
benefits for clients (where the bundling of data and liquidity generates
returns),195 but may also add one layer of complexity that could increase risks
for investors.
Scholars stress that platforms enhance both information asymmetries
and the opportunity for manipulation on the side of the platform providers,
arguing that the consumer-clients of platforms are at the platform providers’
mercy.196 The situation is not entirely the same in the investment fund
192. FIN. STABILITY OVERSIGHT COUNCIL (FSOC), 2018 ANNUAL REPORT 7 (June 2019),
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/261/FSOC2018AnnualReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/4
763-7CMG].
193. Jennifer Rudden, Share of Households Owning Mutual Funds in the U.S. 1980-2019,
STATISTA (May 7, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/246224/mutual-funds-owned-
by-american-households/ [https://perma.cc/4WKE-UNET].
194. JON BECKETT, NEW FUND ORDER – A DIGITAL DEATH FOR FUND SELECTION?, 32 et
seq. (2016).
195. See infra Part IV.A.
196. See Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking Economy: Uber, Information, and
Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1650–54 (2017) (arguing that firms use consumers’
information to nudge consumers to behave in ways that advantage the firm); Giancarlo Frosio,
Reforming Intermediary Liability in the Platform Economy: A European Digital Single
Market Strategy, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 19, 20 (2017) (describing how “[s]afe harbor legislation
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context, since the investment advisors’ and custodians’ clients are at times
sophisticated regulated financial intermediaries, including pension funds.
Regulated intermediaries are by law required to understand the technology
used and engage with platform providers about service quality and stability.
Where consumers are present, mandatory financial legislation addresses
typical consumer related risks such as fraud and excessive, sometimes
hidden, fees charged by intermediaries to consumers. In some cases, the
additional transparency of platform technologies paired with mandatory
disclosure requirements of financial law and financial supervision might
improve the situation for consumers. At the very least, we expect typical
consumer-related risks such as fraud and excessive or hidden fees charged
by intermediaries to be less important. For instance, the front-end platforms
discussed supra compete today with regard to the best costs analysis tools.
We expect this trend to continue.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, an obvious additional risk centers on
the technology: all clients are linked through the platform. Algorithms must
be sufficiently mature to reflect the interests of a large number and
potentially diverse group of clients, ranging from consumers, sophisticated
investors, and wholesale clients to other financial intermediaries, and
sufficiently robust to withstand a number of unforeseen events, ranging from
natural disasters resulting in power outages to cyberattacks.
Another source of risk comes from the platform user guidelines, such
as with soft commissioning based on platform turn-over. Many front-end
platforms require providers of fund products to offer any product offered via
the platform to the platform’s clients for a certain amount of time and ensure
a minimum amount of investment on offer. The same is true for soft
commissions where the shelf time granted by the platform depends on the
overall volume on offer by any given fund manager. The motive for
including such clauses lies in the platform providers’ costs structure:
including a new product on the platform generates some fixed costs on the
side of the platform provider. The minimum requirements should ensure that
those fixed costs are recovered, usually through distribution fees, sales
commissions, or some type of soft dollars (such as research).
Minimum requirements relating to time and volume (or related sales
incentives), however, can come with downsides for investors. Imagine a
small and mid-cap fund investing in enterprises up to 1,000 employees, and
with a maximum firm value of $10 million. The investment opportunities in
such markets are limited. A fund manager driven only by its investors’
interests would stop issuing units once the investment opportunities become
usually does not require intermediaries to monitor the information that they transmit or store,
or to actively seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity”).
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less attractive. Although bonus structures (through carried interest and other
means) align fund managers’ and investors’ interests, the minimum
requirements defined in the platform user guidelines can conflict with these.
If, in compliance with such guidelines, the fund collects more inflows than
can be invested profitably, the returns for the funds’ investors will be diluted,
and all investors will suffer.
Further complexity comes from the competition among some of the
platform clients simultaneously served by the very same digital finance
platform. The divergent interests of clients require strictly segregated
handling of clients’ data. For instance, if both BlackRock and Schroders use
Aladdin, they must ensure that BlackRock’s trading data are not accessible
to Schroders, and vice versa, to avoid market manipulation or insider trading.
While easy to say, this segregated treatment is hard to achieve. Some
technology experts might have access to the two (or multiple) data streams,
since they are used by the same algorithm; otherwise the economies of scale
which drive platform growth will not materialize.
In addition, there are non-fund specific downsides of platforms. For
instance, platforms disrupt the existing legal governance of contractual
relationships by artificially imposing a tech intermediary between the
parties.197 In turn, contractual safeguards and other tools of private ordering
may prove less effective.
IV. A NEWAPPROACH TOREGULATINGDIGITAL FINANCE
PLATFORMS
In this Part, we grapple with the regulatory implications of the risks
digital finance platforms raise for investors, market structures, national
security and financial stability.198 Given the increasing issues posed by
platform concentration in asset management, regulatory approaches need to
be revisited before these risks fully mature. We argue that successfully
regulating digital finance platforms in asset management and more broadly
will involve defining the limits of technological concentration to ensure
prudent investor protection and to maintain well-functioning markets, even
in the face of our current trajectory towards ever larger platforms, an
approach which China now appears to be following in the context of Ant and
other digital finance platforms in China.
197. See Lobel, supra note 171, at 143–44 (concluding that legal disruption is a common
feature of platform economies).
198. See Dirk Zetzsche, Ross Buckley, Janos Barberis & Douglas Arner, Regulating a
Revolution: From FinTech and Regulatory Sandboxes to RegTech and Smart Regulation, 18
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 31, passim (2018) (discussing new regulatory approaches to
financial technology).
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Regulators could adopt, first, a wait-and-see approach. And they could
do so with or without pro-innovative regulatory tools, such as regulatory
sandboxes, test-and-learn methodologies, or special charters. Second,
regulatory efforts could focus on enhancing competition. Third, regulators
could intervene moderately, by regulating delegation arrangements. Fourth,
regulators could require a public agency’s partial or full ownership of certain
systems or platforms. While the full ownership of a digital finance platform
by a regulator (such as the Federal Reserve) could be forced upon the
provider ex-post, via nationalization, another strong interventionist approach
discussed in Part IV.D. would treat certain systems and/or platforms as
utilities. All of these, however, are fundamentally based on disclosure to and
information gathering by supervisors: if supervisors do not build their
knowledge about these sorts of systems as they evolve, they will not be able
to take appropriate judgements in balancing risks and benefits.199
From the outset, we exclude a potential fifth response: prohibition.
Given that digital finance platforms are both crucial infrastructure for
financial markets and provide enormous cost savings for investors,
prohibition is inappropriate. This conclusion contrasts with other areas of
FinTech innovation in which in certain cases, prohibition may be an
advisable response to abuses or risks.200
A. Fostering Innovation: Do Nothing or Test-and-Learn
1. Do Nothing
The first possible approach to digital finance platforms in asset
management or otherwise would simply be not to regulate them. By doing
nothing, the result would be either rigorous or laissez-faire depending upon
whether current financial regulation applies to the operations of a particular
platform. Doing nothing might involve requiring new entrants to comply
with existing financial regulations, often with highly restrictive results and
adverse effects on financial innovation.
Alternately, a do-nothing approach could simultaneously accelerate
financial innovation and exacerbate data-driven market dynamics. China,
especially before 2015, is often highlighted as the leading, and a highly
successful, example of the permissive approach with regard to FinTech.201
199. See Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103 VA. L. REV. 411,
466–80 (2017) (arguing that information asymmetry is a meaningful source of systemic risk
and demanding that regulators should focus on reducing information gaps).
200. See Zetzsche, Buckley, Arner & Föhr, supra note 22, at 305–06 (discussing
prohibition as one policy choice regarding initial coin offerings).
201. SeeWeihuan Zhou, Douglas Arner & Ross Buckley, Regulation of Digital Financial
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While the soundness of the Chinese financial system prior to the FinTech
boom may explain the benefits of doing nothing for innovation and
development in this particular case,202 and while non-legal means allowed
political control over the emerging providers of financial ecosystems, the
Chinese example also demonstrates the systemic risks that can arise from
unexpected and uninhibited growth of certain market participants. That
growth has led, since 2015, to a much more cautious regulatory approach.203
Most notably, during its unregulated period, Alibaba laid the foundation for
forming the world’s largest financial ecosystem (measured by its number of
clients). In our context, a laissez-faire approach would be likely to further
the growth of existing platforms. This approach has largely been the one
taken in most countries so far but still has the potential to result in
undesirable winner-take-all outcomes.
2. Test-and-Learn: Sandboxes, Special Charters and Licenses, and
Innovation Hubs
In the specific context of FinTech innovation, test-and-learn approaches
– including regulatory sandboxes, innovation hubs, and special charters and
licenses 204 – have been discussed as methods to support balanced
innovation.205 These tools, while far from being a panacea, do enhance the
Services in China: Last Mover Advantage?, 8 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 25, 27–28 (2015)
（alleging that the Chinese regulations of digital financial services before 2015 lack detailed
and comprehensive provisions） ; Douglas Arner, Janos Barberis & Ross Buckley, The
Evolution of FinTech: A New Post-Crisis Paradigm?, 47 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1271, 1298–99
(2017) (arguing that due to the adoption of a largely commercialized financial system, there
is a rapid growth of P2P lending platforms in China since 2009); Weihuan Zhou, et al.,
China’s Regulation of Digital Financial Services: Some Recent Developments, 90 AUSTL. L.J.
297 (2016) (arguing that the regulatory work has progressed slowly to enable the rapid growth
of digital financial service in China).
202. See Christian Haddad & Lars Hornuf, The Emergence of the Global FinTech Market:
Economic and Technical Determinants 20 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 6131, 2016),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2830124 [https://perma.cc/Y528-7U79] (arguing that the soundness
of the financial system has a negative effect on FinTech start-up dynamics; i.e. financial
systems with many deficits provide a vibrant environment for start-ups).
203. Zhou, Arner & Buckley, supra note 201, at 27.
204. A regulatory sandbox is a safe space in which innovative FinTech applications can
be tested with sharply reduced regulatory requirements (subject to certain pre-conditions). An
innovation hub is a portal that facilitates access of industry to regulators and seeks to promote
bespoke regulation, no-action letters, and other dispensations on a case-by-case basis. Special
charters are authorizations to conduct FinTech type businesses without having to comply with
the full panoply of financial regulation, though subject to special limits. See generally Ross
P Buckley et al., Building FinTech Ecosystems: Regulatory Sandboxes, Innovation Hubs and
Beyond, 61 WASH. J. L. & POL’Y 55, 56–61 (2020) (introducing regulatory sandboxes and
innovation hubs in fintech regulations).
205. See Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579–645 (2019)
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flow of information between innovative firms and their regulators. These
tools may prove of little value, however, since they are designed to promote
testing of new technologies and business models rather than regulate global
players.
B. Supporting Competition
A second regulatory approach could focus on enhancing competition to
ensure competitive market forces play a beneficial role rather than contribute
to an already concentrated financial sector. Pro-competition measures have
been considered with regard to IT/software,206 critical FMIs such as payment,
clearing, and settlement systems,207 and in “open banking” initiatives.208
1. Mandating Access
Regulation could aim at securing objective, transparent, and fair risk-
based rather than profit-based conditions of access. Open interfaces, open
source code of the technology core, fair and non-discriminatory access
requirements, and a transparent fee structure enable third-party developers
(“Regulatory sandboxes offer an environment in which fintech entrepreneurs can conduct
limited tests of their innovations with fewer regulatory constraints, real customers, less risk
of enforcement action, and ongoing guidance from regulators.”); Chris Brummer, Disruptive
Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 1047–51 (2015) (arguing
that innovation hubs provide businesses with individual guidance and additional support in
order to help developers understand the regulatory framework); Chris Brummer & Yesha
Yadav, FinTech and the Innovation Trilemma, 107 GEO L.J. 235–307 (2019) (offering a
general introduction of innovative regulatory strategies to navigate the policy trilemma in
regulating fintech); Kathryn Judge, Investor-Driven Financial Innovation, 8 HARV. BUS. L.
REV. 291, 334–341 (2018) (providing an overview of the different innovative regulations in
fintech); Saule Omarova, New Tech v. New Deal: FinTech As A Systemic Phenomenon, 36
YALE J. ON REG. 735–793 (2019) (introducing how fintech has eroded the New Deal
settlement and the need for a novel conceptual framework); W.J. Magnuson, Regulating
FinTech, 71 VANDERBILT L. R. 1168–1226 (2018) (calling for a wide-ranging
reconceptualization of financial regulation in fintech); Zetzsche, Buckley, Barberis & Arner,
supra note 198, passim (discussing new regulatory approaches in fintech).
206. See, e.g., MICROSOFT ON TRIAL: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A
TRANSATLANTIC ANTITRUST CASE passim (Luca Rubini ed., 2010) (introducing the pro-
competition measures used to regulate dominant technology players like Microsoft).
207. See, in particular, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS,
supra note 7, at 101 (discussing access conditions by providers of Financial Market
Infrastructure).
208. See Markos Zachariadis & Pinar Ozcan, The API Economy and Digital
Transformation in Financial Services: The Case of Open Banking 2–23 (SWIFT Inst.,
Working Paper No. 2016-001, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2975199 [https://perma.cc/5
N4L-VHFV] (discussing the challenges and opportunities that open application programming
interfaces bring to the open banking sector).
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to write proprietary applications for platform clients. 209 In this regard,
Principle 18 of the IOSCO principles on access to the services of critical
infrastructure providers is relevant:
[a]n FMI’s participation requirements should be justified in terms
of the safety and efficiency of the FMI and the markets it serves,
be tailored to and commensurate with the FMI’s specific risks, and
be publicly disclosed. Subject to maintaining acceptable risk
control standards, an FMI should endeavor to set requirements that
have the least-restrictive impact on access that circumstances
permit.210
2. Diversification
Regulators could also ask clients to diversify their own risks from their
dependency on the platform. Regulation could require that any financial
firm must employ at least two or more providers/systems, and that these be
unrelated to each other. While mandatory diversification has some positive
effects on market structure, it also comes with increased costs, imposed
redundancy, additional cybersecurity risks (given that multiple systems
would have access to the firm’s client data), and reduced benefits of
datafication (because of slowed IT processes). Most importantly, mandated
diversification could reduce platform benefits for clients: one look and feel,
one service level, and one service quality, as well as the accumulation and
best use of a client’s liquidity for ensuring lower costs on the back-end.
Mandatory diversification, if imposed, might work only on the back-end.
An alternative to this mandatory diversification suggestion might be
limiting a platform’s maximum share of clients in a given market; we discuss
this more interventionist approach infra, at Part IV.D.
3. Rotation
Instead of diversification and following the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s
provisions on auditors, clients could be required to switch providers every
few years. Rotation would likely be costly: all weblinks, data interfaces, and
209. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 231 F. Supp. 2d 144 (D.D.C. 2002)
(settling the year-long U.S. Department of Justice’s antitrust litigation against Microsoft on
abusive terms for third-party web browser software and requiringMicrosoft to make available
for use by third parties on reasonable and non-discriminatory terms certain technology used
by Microsoft server operating system products to interoperate with Windows operating
system products).
210. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’N, PRINCIPLES FOR
FINANCIALMARKET INFRASTRUCTURES 101 (Apr. 2012), https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d10
1a.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VH5-5TQK].
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brokerage connections would need readjustment after each switch, giving the
institution’s clients even more reason to contract directly with the platform
provider. Providers will also find it difficult to negotiate fee reductions
based on liquidity streams if the law mandates regular displacements of the
very liquidity for which the discount provides an incentive to stay. Further,
if the technology of their clients is linked – either technically or
economically – to the platform, an institution’s clients will have even more
reason to contract directly with the platform, thereby exacerbating, rather
than slowing, market concentration.
4. Open Data
Regulators could mandate that incumbents grant new entrants access to
client account data; the new entrant could then reduce a client’s switching
costs by securing smooth tech migration. While standardization of client
data is a crucial precondition for smooth migration,211 doubts remain about
whether in fact small new entrants would benefit from such a rule. In
particular, in the case of the EU’s Open Banking Initiative, access to client
data appears to facilitate the market access of large technology companies
that have resources to (1) attract a sufficient number of new clients and (2)
program large scale data transfer interfaces.212
We thus propose requiring open client data only from firms with a
strong, potentially dominant position. In an effort to hamper the further
concentration in the asset management industry, an open data requirement
paired with a data governance requirement could be attached once market
share exceeds, say, five percent in any asset management market, in order to
break into the data-based economies of scale and allow easier entry for
smaller competitors.
5. Unbundling of Services and Prices
Another regulatory strategy would be to mandate separate service
pricing and an option for clients to source distinct and separate services from
a digital finance platform. Unbundling seeks to separate fees for different
211. See Giuseppe Colangelo & Oscar Borgogno, Data, Innovation and Transatlantic
Competition in Finance: The Case of the Access to Account Rule 22–26 (Eur. Union Law
Working Paper No. 35, 2018) (observing that an EU-wide FinTech market requires
standardization to simplify data transmission and facilitate competition and interoperability).
212. See Dirk Zetzsche, Douglas Arner, Ross Buckley & Rolf Weber, The Evolution and
Future of Data-Driven Finance in the EU, 57 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 331 (2020)
(analyzing the facilitation of open banking in the EU to enhance competition in banking and
payments).
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services previously sold as a package and prohibit hidden bundling rebates
(“tying”). Unbundling aims at two different goals. First, the price of a single
service becomes transparent, allowing new entrants to review whether they
can compete by offering a better single service, if they cannot compete with
the whole platform. Second, unbundling prohibits the cross-subsidization of
some services from the proceeds of other services for which there may be
more competition.
Unbundling as a regulatory requirement, however, must be handled
with care. Unbundling reduces some efficiencies that stem from bundled
client contacts and the better data inherent in handling more and related
services simultaneously. 213 After all, unbundling involves ripping the
integrated platform apart, though its very integration is one of its main
benefits. Regulators imposing unbundling requirements face the further
difficulty of determining which part of a service may be untied at what point
in time, without impeding innovation based upon disintermediation. We
discuss the more interventionist variant of unbundling in which offering of
some services together with others would be prohibited infra, at Part IV.
6. Merger Control
Merger control is the standard antitrust approach to overly concentrated
markets. Though antitrust law’s main rationale is market efficiency, our
analysis of digital finance platforms suggests that merger control can also be
justified from a financial regulation perspective: mergers of very large
platforms could be prohibited not only because of antitrust concerns, but also
for client protection, innovation, and especially, financial stability concerns.
C. Moderate Regulatory Interventions
As moderate regulatory interventions, regulators have at their disposal
various types of command-and-control, self-regulatory, and co-regulatory
approaches. The approach will depend on the stage of evolution of any given
platform. As a general matter, the greater the scale and/or significance of a
digital finance platform, the stronger the case for an intervention.214
213. There is a wide body of antitrust literature discussing tying practices and unbundling
requirements. See Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision-
Theoretic Approach, 69 ANTITRUST L.J. 469, 469–526 (2001) (reviewing post-Chicago tying
law and theory and analyzing tying doctrine using decision theory); see also Nicholas
Economides & Ioannis Lianos, The Elusive Antitrust Standard on Bundling in Europe and in
the United States in the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 483–567
(2009) (analyzing the bundling approaches of Europe and the United States and advocating
for a unified test for bundling and tying).
214. For guidance, see BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS,
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1. Command-and-Control Regulation
a. Regulating Financial Data Gathering and Analytics
A standard response of regulators to increasing concentration within a
given industry includes adding an additional layer of regulation upon
participants, particularly through licensing as a regulated activity. In doing
so, they enhance control over the sector and obtain better data for regulatory
decisions. The difficulty in submitting digital finance platforms to regulation
is finding a common denominator of activities that accurately describes the
range of activities potentially involved.
Given that the core of platform activity is data collection and
processing, regulators could define “financial data gathering and analytics”
as a regulated activity and provide exemptions to participants that do not
meet certain size or scope requirements. The result of such regulation could
be a differentiated regime with tiered rules for large platforms, similar to the
rules applicable to SIFIs: moderate reporting requirements for mid-size
platforms and a mere registration requirement with no additional disclosures
for small ones.
b. Indirect Regulation: Delegation and/or Counterparties
An alternative approach focuses on the regulated clients of any given
platform. Requiring regulated users to ensure a number of prerequisites
would create advantages, particularly in cross-border settings, where only
parts of the platform are located within a regulator’s ambit. For instance,
regulations often require regulated entities to ensure compliance with the
laws of their home jurisdiction, even where they delegate services to entities
located in other jurisdictions. Limits of indirect regulation arise, however,
when the delegating firm depends on the delegate’s services but not vice
versa. This one-sided dependency can be due to a delegate’s size (rendering
the delegate less dependent on a single client), the outsourcing firm’s lack of
alternatives in a given sector, or significant transaction costs hindering an
easy switch. The first concern is possibly – and the following two concerns
are certainly – present in the case of digital finance platforms.
A closer look reveals that regulated firms have very few means to
ensure platform stability and honest conduct. How can a client of Aladdin
ensure that Aladdin performs its technology job properly? The value of
many firms today is in the data, which Aladdin possesses. Clients cannot
credibly put firms under pressure whose market value is many times larger
supra note 7, at 12–13 (discussing applicability and proportionality of the FMI principles).
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than their own (BlackRock could, for instance, readily buy G-SIFI Deutsche
Bank). Nor can clients apply controls that ensure the technology works. In
the end, financial institutions are at the mercy of dominant platforms.
In the context of dominant digital finance platforms, the outsourcing
relationship is inverted, and the tail wags the dog: indirect regulation is ill-
equipped to counter the fact that the platform is the heart of many financial
firms, particularly in asset management.
c. Code Review by FSAs
A different regulatory approach could focus on the underlying code, i.e.
its technical functionality. Supervisory agencies could seek to understand
the technology and require additional code aimed at meaningfully balancing
private incentives with public interests. Such a code-focused approach
would ask much from regulators trained in financial and legal matters.215 To
our knowledge, a review tool for the functionality and limits of self-learning
algorithms has yet to be developed,216 while model risk assessment is among
the most complex tasks in modern finance; even the best funded and most
sensitive organizations – including the Department of Defense and CIA –
fail, at times, to combat cyber threats.217
2. Self-Regulation
Self-regulation is a critical means of drawing upon the knowledge of
participants when regulators reach the limits of their own expertise. FMI
providers thus typically establish a common set of rules and procedures for
all participants, a technical infrastructure, and a specialized, customized risk
management framework.218 While these rules and procedures often take a
contractual format, a self-regulatory approach could formalize the adoption
and amendment of these rules and establish a minimum publication and
notice period. Regulators could use these frameworks to enhance control
over platforms.
215. We have considered the issues of how regulators can address cyber risks elsewhere,
see Buckley et al., supra note 184 (offering ways to address the emerging security risks that
result from technical innovation and digitization of finance).
216. See Joshua Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 633–705
(2017) (proposing a technological toolkit to verify and review automated decision systems).
217. See Significant Cyber Incidents, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC& INT’L STUD., https://www.cs
is.org/programs/strategic-technologies-program/significant-cyber-incidents [https://perma.cc
/P9MC-ZMQM] (last visited Oct. 28, 2020) (providing details about significant cyber-attacks
on government agencies).
218. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS & INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, supra note 7, at 7
(defining FMIs and describing their function and the range of their features).
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The downside of self-regulation is the dependency of the “self-
regulated constituency” on adopting rules. Where the collective private and
public interests collide, we might expect few serious efforts at self-
regulation. In particular, although we might see the establishment of basic
investor protections, the provider and its participants have little interest in
slowing growth by curtailing the network effects from which they benefit,
and so will do little to combat antitrust concerns and size-based systemic
risk. Self-regulatory organizations thus face the tension between remaining
light-touch and interest-friendly or turning, like FINRA,219 into more of a
public oversight body focused on technicalities in addition to mandatory
regulation.
3. Co-Regulation
Regulators could pursue a co-regulation strategy. Co-regulation has
been defined as a
“mechanism whereby [a] legislative act entrusts the attainment of
the objectives defined by the legislative authority to parties which
are recognized in the field (such as economic operators, the social
partners, non-governmental organizations, or associations)” by
setting “objectives to be attained but their achievement is entrusted
to non-public actors in economic and social domains.”220
Co-regulation has been discussed as potentially effective for non-financial
platform industries, through its inclusion of a broad pool of innovators “in
the articulation, execution and evolution of policy, law, norms development,
oversight and regulation,”221 leading to more balanced views. Examples
include agreements between local authorities and Airbnb on the collection
of tourist tax.222
For digital finance platforms, regulators could seek to enter into co-
regulation agreements with operators that reflect public concerns such as
systemic risk, customer protection, market integrity, and national security.
As with any other regulatory tool, however, co-regulation has its limits when
the public interest collides with the provider’s private interest in making
219. See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, Becoming a Fifth Branch, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 12–23 (2013) (analyzing the evolution of FINRA from a self-regulatory
organization to a quasi-governmental organization).
220. See Michèle Finck, Digital Co-Regulation: Designing a Supranational Legal
Framework for the Platform Economy 15 (LSE Legal Stud. Working Paper No. 15, 2017), ht
tps://ssrn.com/abstract=2990043 [https://perma.cc/55E5-EQUD] (defining co-regulation).
221. See Raymond Brescia, Regulating the Sharing Economy: New and Old Insights into
an Oversight Regime for the Peer-to-Peer Economy, 95 NEB. L. REV. 87, 134 (2015)
(recognizing the benefits of decentralized policymaking and regulatory pluralism).
222. See the list of examples by Finck, supra note 220, at 15–18.
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profits. Thus, although co-regulation could be a way to implement moderate
investor protection and national security measures, it may be less effective
with regard to the antitrust and financial stability concerns we have outlined.
D. Regulation as Public Utilities
1. Public Utility Status
In line with scholarship on platform industries, 223 digital finance
platforms could be regulated as public utilities. Regulation characteristics of
public utilities include, for instance, rate regulation, minimum service level
and quality assurance prescriptions, and a defined or capped rate of return on
investments. This list demonstrates that traditional public utility regulation
fits best for highly standardized services such as energy and water supply.
Regulators seeking to set the aforementioned limits in a highly innovative,
rapidly growing environment such as asset management and finance more
generally will face potentially insurmountable challenges.
A less intrusive form of public utility status is the designation of certain
systems as Financial Market Utilities under Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank
Act, asking for advanced risk-management methods, intensified supervision,
and advance notice of rule changes.224 These rules were drafted for clearing
organizations and central counterparties and would need amendments to
reflect the data and liquidity dimension of digital finance platforms stressed
in this Article. This is the approach being taken in China in the context of
Ant and other digital finance platforms: designating them as systemically
important financial institutions – for instance at the holding company level
where a new group regulatory approach has been introduced – and subjecting
them to higher regulatory and supervisory attention.
2. Participation / Ownership of Public Agencies
As a form of indirect regulation, supervisory authorities could become
significant shareholders or operators of a digital finance platform. Examples
223. See K. Sabeel Rahman, The New Utilities: Private Power, Social Infrastructure, and
the Revival of the Public Utility Concept, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 1621, 1634 (2018) (arguing
that public utility concepts offer a framework for understanding and contesting private power
in a variety of sectors, including the financial and platform markets); K. Sabeel Rahman,
Regulating Informational Infrastructure: Internet Platforms as the New Public Utilities, 2
GEO. L. TECH. REV. 234, 240–46 (2018) (detailing how the utility concept applies to internet
platforms).
224. Designated Financial Market Utilities, BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS.,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/title-viii-dfa.htm [https://perma.cc/G7PQ-
WDP3] (last visited Oct. 28, 2020).
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include RTGS payment systems in which the technology core is developed
with the involvement of central banks that, in some cases, also engage in
operations. Similar approaches are now being seen in an increasing number
of jurisdictions at the retail level with “fast payment systems.”225 Putting
aside the obvious capacity constraints of many competent authorities, having
a stake in a digital finance platform at the same time brings potential
informational advantages for a central bank or other regulatory agency.
On the downside, authority stakes in a platform create a potentially
undesirable outcome: the platform in which a central bank or other
authorities take a stake is likely to be a monopolist. This monopolist will
likely leave little room for additional market-led innovation. Governmental
investment makes the most sense in markets where competition is unlikely
to develop in the first place, such as where existing financial institutions are
insufficiently funded or tech expertise is scarce,226 or where competition is
undesirable because all financial institutions must meet the same standard in
order to reduce their customers’ transaction costs (such as in payment
systems).
E. Unbundling
A more interventionist approach would mandate unbundling.
Unbundling is well established as an antitrust measure, yet financial law also
frequently imposes separation and unbundling. Some contend, indeed, that
a “core principle[]” of banking law is the “separation of banking and
commerce.”227 At least in the U.S., pursuant to the Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956, firms that own or control a U.S. bank are prohibited from
225. Anton Didenko, Dirk A. Zetzsche, DouglasW. Arner &Ross P. Buckley, After Libra,
Digital Yuan and COVID-19: Central Bank Digital Currencies and the New World of Money
and Payment Systems 9 (European Banking Inst., Working Paper Series 65, 2020), https://ssr
n.com/abstract=3622311 [https://perma.cc/UQN9-T6Y3].
226. We find these preconditions often met in developing and emerging economies. This
explains why India’s central bank has developed and functions as operator of core
infrastructure for financial services through public-private partnerships such as the National
Payments Corporation of India. See About Us, NAT’L PAYMENTSCORP. OF INDIA, https://ww
w.npci.org.in/who-we-are/about-us [https://perma.cc/G8NR-TU6M] (last visited Oct. 28,
2020) (describing NPCI as a not-for-profit umbrella organization for all retail payments in
India).
227. See Saule T. Omarova, The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and
Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265, 268, 274–75 (2013) (outlining the policy rationale for
separating banking from certain commercial activities); see alsoKhan, supra note 153, at 794;
Bernard Shull, Banking and Commerce in the United States, 18 J. BANKING& FIN. 255, 267
(1994), reprinted in Bernard Shull, Banking and Commerce in the United States, 27 J.
REPRINTS ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 359, 371 (1997) (reviewing the historical relationship
between banking and commerce and the policies underlying their separation).
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engaging in business activities other than banking or managing banks.228
Investment regulation provides for similar separation and unbundling.
For instance, the role of an investment advisor is to be separated from that
of, first, the investment company holding legal title to fund assets; second,
the custodian, which in most cases has custody of the fund’s assets; and third,
the broker-dealers and financial planners who assist investors in selecting
funds. These unbundling requirements reflect that fund management,
safekeeping, and investor roles together represent the traditional interest
spheres of collective or pooled investments.229 In principle, whoever acts on
the side of the investor, such as broker-dealers, wealth managers, estate
planners or investment advisers (together referred to as “client
intermediaries”), is by law bound to serve the investor’s individual interest,
while the fund manager and custodian/depositary should be committed to the
“fund” rather than individual investors.
In particular, the Investment Company Act requires mutual funds to
maintain strict custody of fund assets separate from the assets of the fund
manager.230 In principle, all investments by registered investment companies
“shall be deposited in the safekeeping of, or in a vault or other depository
maintained by, a bank or other company whose functions and physical
facilities are supervised by Federal or State authority.” 231 Third-party
custody enables investment funds to control both their own assets and assets
(particularly collateral) held by the custodian when the custodian
experiences difficulties. The advantage of this approach was highlighted in
the aftermath of the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in
2008.232
This approach reveals the insight that each core intermediary fulfils a
228. See Khan, supra note 153, at 794 (stressing the similarity of these rules with antitrust
and competition policy objectives and stating that the main justifications for preserving the
separation between banking and commerce include “the needs to preserve the safety and
soundness of insured depository institutions, to ensure a fair and efficient flow of credit to
productive [businesses], and to prevent excessive concentration of financial and economic
power in the financial sector”).
229. SeeMorley, supra note 126, at 1238–42 (introducing the idea of separating funds and
managers).
230. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-2 (2019) (custody of investments by registered management
investment company). For further custody requirements see 17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-1 (2019)
(broker-dealer custody); 17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-2 (b) (self-custody); 17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-4
(2019) (securities depositories); 17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-5 (2019) (foreign banks); 17 C.F.R. §
270.17f-6 (2019) (futures commission merchants); and 17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-7 (2019) (foreign
securities depositories).
231. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-2 (b) (2019).
232. See Comprehensive Regulatory Regime for U.S. Mutual Funds, INV. CO. INST. (2014),
https://www.ici.org/pdf/14_ici_usfunds_regulation.pdf [https://perma.cc/UQC5-JWWH]
(observing that mutual funds with third-party custody arrangements were able to take control
of their collateral more easily than market participants without such arrangements).
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controlling function vis-à-vis each other type of intermediary. As long as
the core intermediary functions are separate, we can expect an equilibrium
to exist in the relations between the different types of core intermediaries. If
separation is ensured, then market forces may lead to undesirable results only
within each core intermediary.
The necessity of having types of intermediaries separated prompts the
question whether there ought to be limits to disruption. Law is static and,
for financial law, enforced by supervisory authorities. As such, law may
function as a barrier to disruption. Specifically, the law may limit the extent
to which tech-based innovation streamlines the value chain and the services
integrated into platforms. If disruption is limited to innovations within each
of the core intermediary functions, for structural reasons, the law must
clearly define those limits.
A closer look reveals, however, that these limits are blurred. Under rule
17f-2(c), the Investment Company Act allows for self-custody with regard to
various securities collateralized, escrowed, or in transit, or in other
transactions necessary or appropriate in the ordinary course of business
relating to the management of securities.233 Insolvency risk does not vanish
in the context of digital finance platforms. Rather, with greater market
concentration, a provider’s insolvency might have a more severe impact.
Other jurisdictions have thus abolished self-custody and always require
third-party custody of investment fund assets.234
A discussion of investor protections in custody arrangements is beyond
the scope of this Article. We are interested only in the limits to platform
building in U.S. custody law. To address platform-based concentration, it
may be advisable to amend Rule 17f-2(c) so that the investment company
and investment advisor may hold only insignificant amounts of assets of their
own. The fact that “[n]early all mutual funds use a bank custodian for
domestic securities, and the custody agreement is typically far more
elaborate than the arrangements used for other bank clients”235 suggests that
this policy recommendation is in line with client expectations and industry
practice.
In a similar vein, a strict line between the client intermediary function
233. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17f-2 (b) (2019).
234. See Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2011 on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and
2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010, 2011 O.J. (L. 174)
28 Article 21; Sebastiaan Hooghiemstra, Depositary Regulation, in THE ALTERNATIVE
INVESTMENT FUNDS DIRECTIVE 441, 460–66 (Zetzsche ed., 3rd ed., 2020); John Siena,
Depositaries: Still a Bit of a Mess, in THEALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUNDSDIRECTIVE 497,
526–33 (Zetzsche ed., 3rd ed., 2020); Dirk A. Zetzsche, (Prime) Brokerage, in THE
ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENT FUNDSDIRECTIVE 545, 569 (Zetzsche ed., 3rd ed., 2020).
235. INV. CO. INST., supra note 232.
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and the fund manager function prevents additional conflicts of interests from
greater integration of service functions. If an investment adviser provides its
own products, it has an incentive to offer those to clients rather than products
possibly better suited to clients. If the investment adviser functions as a
custodian, it may seek to enhance profits from its custodian function by
channeling investors’ assets into those funds rather than recommending the
best investment to its clients. Demanding strict separation of investment
advice, broker-dealers, and custodians is somewhat distant from current
industry practice. Broker-dealer conglomerates like Charles Schwab not
only provide brokerage and investment advice – as a client intermediary –
but also offer ETFs, a part of their role as fund managers. This fact exposes
a large possible flaw in existing securities regulation: all of these services
could be provided through entities owned and controlled by one holding
company. In particular, the U.S. Bank Holding Company Act allows a bank
that qualifies as a “financial holding company” to conduct all activities that
are “financial in nature,” including securities dealing and insurance
underwriting. 236 As we have shown, many incumbents rely on this
exemption to present front-to-back comprehensive financial ecosystems,
putting the very policy objective at risk.
A softer form of unbundling and separation would require segregation.
For instance, an investment advisor might be prohibited from booking the
fund’s asset in its own accounts, though it might under certain circumstances
hold the assets in an account earmarked as investors’ assets. An even softer
form would merely manage conflicts: two functions could be provided by
one entity, but an information barrier would have to be erected and conflicts
monitored – avoided where possible and managed where unavoidable.
Along these lines, regulation could require the unbundling and
separation of these four functions not only legally – as the law currently does
by requiring separate legal entities to perform these tasks – but also
technically. A technical unbundling requirement would declare a platform
illegal that simultaneously provides or facilitates fund manager, fund,
custodian, and investor functions, and uses both data and liquidity access to
secure control over the whole fund value chain.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article offers three main contributions to the law of finance. First,
we conceptualize and provide a theoretical analysis of digital finance
platforms. In the asset management industry, these platforms are developing
on the front- and back-end and, over time, appear to be evolving into
236. Omarova, supra note 227, at 268 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(A)).
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comprehensive, front-to-back financial ecosystems.
Second, we show that as a result of technological evolution, asset
management – and finance more generally – is an emerging, quickly
growing, and unappreciated species of platform industry, with many of the
attendant benefits and concerns. We argue that ever-more parts of the asset
management value chain will be integrated in ever-fewer dominant platform
ecosystems. It is this process that is central to understanding the evolution
of passive investment platforms. This evolution could be partly beneficial,
as disintermediation can drive costs down. While this happens, societies –
and their financial regulations – must seek to remain open to innovation and
to balance innovation against risk.
Third, we argue that law and regulation must respond to the emergence
of digital finance platforms in asset management. More broadly, regulators
should apply legal approaches commensurate with the scale, scope, and role
of each platform. Those interventions range from fostering innovation by
taking a wait-and-see approach, to a pro-competition approach by moderate
regulatory interventions, and finally to strict regulation as public utilities.
The options regulators should take will depend on the stage of
development of a given digital finance platform, particularly in terms of
market share, dominance, and the significance of the functions the platform
provides. Regulators must, however, be prepared to act to curtail the
significant risks associated with digital finance platforms, as now appears to
be happening in China.237 These platforms are already so central to the asset
management industry that the biggest of them are too big to fail. We do not
yet know whether the greatest threat from digital finance platforms will
emerge from their domineering success or catastrophic failure, but in either
event, now is the time for sober legislative and regulatory scrutiny.
237 See Ant’s Failed IPO Points to Wider Clash on FinTech, FIN. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/f3cf30a2-bf5d-43a7-8a30-3fa10712e556
[https://perma.cc/7HQL-EABZ].
